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THE RACIAL GEOGRAPHY OF THE FEDERAL DEATH 
PENALTY 
G. Ben Cohen∗ & Robert J. Smith† 
Abstract: Scholars have devoted substantial attention to both the overrepresentation of 
black defendants on federal death row and the disproportionate number of federal defendants 
charged capitally for the murder of white victims. This attention has not explained (much less 
resolved) these disquieting racial disparities. Little research has addressed the unusual 
geography of the federal death penalty, in which a small number of jurisdictions are 
responsible for the vast majority of federal death sentences. By addressing the unique 
geography, we identify a possible explanation for the racial distortions in the federal death 
penalty: that federal death sentences are sought disproportionately where the expansion of the 
venire from the county to the district level has a dramatic demographic impact on the racial 
make-up of the jury. This inquiry demonstrates that the conversation concerning who should 
make up the jury of twelve neighbors and peers—a discussion begun well before the 
founding of our Constitution—continues to have relevance today. This Article documents the 
historical and racial relationships between place and the ability to seat an impartial jury. We 
then discuss the unique impact demographic shifts in the jury pool have on death penalty 
decision making. Finally, we propose three possible solutions: (1) a simple, democracy-
enhancing fix through a return to the historical conception of the county as the place of 
vicinage in federal capital trials; (2) a Batson-type three-step process for rooting out the 
influence of race on the decision to prosecute federally; and/or (3) voluntary measures by the 
Attorney General to mask demographic and location identifiers when deciding whether to 
provide federal death-authorization. We explain why a return to county-level jury pools in 
federal capital cases (whether through statutory construction, legislative change, or through 
the authority of a fair-minded Attorney General) prospectively limits the impact of race on 
the operation of the federal death penalty, without establishing the intractability of the federal 
death penalty as a whole. Finally, we observe that any effort to study the federal death 
penalty cannot merely address those federal cases in which the Attorney General has 
considered whether to approve an effort to seek the death penalty, but must also include an 
assessment of the cases prosecuted in state court that could be prosecuted federally and the 
prosecutorial decision concerning when and whether to prosecute in federal court. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“I can’t help but be both personally and professionally disturbed by the 
numbers that we discuss today . . . . [N]o one reading this [Department 
of Justice] report [on race and the federal death penalty] can help but be 
disturbed, troubled, by this [racial and ethnic] disparity.” 
 
— [Deputy] Attorney General Eric Holder1 
 
“The truth of every accusation, whether preferred in the shape of 
indictment, information, or appeal, should afterwards be confirmed by 
the unanimous suffrage of twelve of his equals and neighbours.” 
 
— Blackstone2 
 
“And, behold, a certain lawyer stood up, and tempted him, saying, 
Master, what shall I do to inherit eternal life? He said unto him, What is 
written in the law? how readest thou? And he answering said, Thou shalt 
love . . . thy neighbour as thyself. And he said unto him, Thou hast 
answered right: this do, and thou shalt live. But he, willing to justify 
himself, said unto Jesus, And who is my neighbour?” 
 
— Luke 10:25–293 
 
The United States Supreme Court’s elaborate capital punishment 
jurisprudence is designed to ensure that capital trials are endowed with 
legitimacy,4 that only the most culpable murderers with the least 
mitigation receive a death sentence,5 and that the sentence is not 
                                                     
1. Marc Lacey & Raymond Bonner, Reno Troubled by Death Penalty Statistics, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 12, 2000, at A17.  
2. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *348 (describing the role of the jury).  
3. Luke 10:25–29 (King James) (emphasis added).  
4. See, e.g., Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411 (1991) (reversing death sentence and explaining 
that racial discrimination in the selection of jurors “casts doubt on the integrity of the judicial 
process and places the fairness of a criminal proceeding in doubt” (internal quotation and citation 
omitted)).   
5. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. __ (June 25, 2008), 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2650 (2008) (“When 
the law punishes by death, it risks its own sudden descent into brutality, transgressing the 
constitutional commitment to decency and restraint. For these reasons we have explained that 
capital punishment must ‘be limited to those offenders who commit “a narrow category of the most 
serious crimes” and whose extreme culpability makes them ‘the most deserving of execution.’” 
(quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005) (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 
319 (2002)))). 
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bestowed upon the innocent.6 But the jurisprudence—or at least its 
collective goal of avoiding the imposition of arbitrary death sentences—
has not been altogether satisfactory.7 Problems in the administration of 
the federal death penalty are illustrative. 
Race-based arbitrariness threatens the fair administration of the death 
penalty.8 Blacks and other minority group members are over-represented 
on death rows across the country.9 Statistics suggest that defendants are 
more likely to be sentenced to death for killing a white victim than a 
black victim.10 Blacks are also executed disproportionately—and have 
been since 1976.11 Again, the federal death penalty is illustrative. Black 
inmates constitute twenty-eight of the fifty-seven (49%) inmates on 
federal death row.12 As then-Assistant Attorney General Eric Holder 
emphasized in reaction to a September 2000 Department of Justice study 
of the federal death penalty, these disparities are alarming in a country 
where blacks constitute less than 13% of the population.13 These same 
disparities persist even now that Eric Holder has been appointed the 
current Attorney General in the Obama Administration. In fact, early 
reports indicated that he has authorized the death penalty at the same 
                                                     
6. See In re Davis, 557 U.S. __ (Aug. 17, 2009), 130 S. Ct. 1, 1 (2009) (transferring the 
petitioner’s writ of habeas corpus to a federal district court with orders to “receive testimony and 
make findings of fact as to whether evidence that could not have been obtained at the time of trial 
clearly establishes petitioner’s innocence”); id. at 2 (“Today this Court takes the extraordinary 
step—one not taken in nearly 50 years—of instructing a district court to adjudicate a state prisoner’s 
petition for an original writ of habeas corpus.”) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
7. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2659 (“The tension between general rules and case-specific 
circumstances has produced results not all together satisfactory. This has led some Members of the 
Court to say we should cease efforts to resolve the tension and simply allow legislatures, 
prosecutors, courts, and juries greater latitude. For others the failure to limit these same 
imprecisions by stricter enforcement of narrowing rules has raised doubts concerning the 
constitutionality of capital punishment itself. Our response to this case law, which is still in search 
of a unifying principle, has been to insist upon confining the instances in which capital punishment 
may be imposed.” (internal quotations and citations omitted)). 
8. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
9. As of January 2010, there are 3261 defendants on death row in the United States of America, 
44% of these defendants are white. The rest are minority defendants. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
PROJECT, NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND, INC., DEATH ROW U.S.A.: WINTER 
2010, at 1 (2010), available at http://www.naacpldf.org/files/publications/DRUSA_Winter_2010.pdf. 
10. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 286. 
11. To date, African-Americans and minorities make up 44% of the individuals executed since 
1976. See Death Penalty Information Center, National Statistics on the Death Penalty and Race, 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/race-death-row-inmates-executed-1976 (last visited June 11, 
2010). 
12. Death Penalty Information Center, List of Prisoners, Federal Death Row Prisoners, 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/federal-death-row-prisoners (last visited July 2, 2010).  
13. See Lacey & Bonner, supra note 1.  
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rate, in the same places, and for the same race as did his predecessors in 
the Bush Administration.14 
Geographic disparities also persist. To promote uniformity, United 
States Attorneys submit all death-eligible federal cases to the United 
States Attorney General for death-authorization.15 Yet the geography of 
the federal death penalty is anything but uniform. Six of the ninety-four 
federal judicial districts account for one-third of death-authorizations.16 
More than half of all death-authorizations come from fourteen federal 
districts.17 Seven federal districts are responsible for approximately 40% 
of the individuals on federal death row.18 Two-thirds of districts have not 
sentenced anyone to death.19 Nearly one-third of federal districts have 
                                                     
14. See, e.g., Ari Shapiro, No Decrease in Death Penalty Approval Rate, NAT’L PUB. RADIO, 
Dec.10, 2009, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=120900944 (last visited Dec. 
30, 2009). 
15. See, e.g., U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, TITLE 9: CRIMINAL DIVISION, at § 9-10.050 [hereinafter 
USAM], available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/ 
10mcrm.htm. (“In all cases, the United States Attorney must immediately notify the Capital Case 
Unit when a capital offense is charged and provide the Unit with a copy of the indictment and cause 
number . . . .”); id. at § 9-10.030 (“Each such decision [whether to seek the death penalty] must be 
based upon the facts and law applicable to the case and be set within a framework of consistent and 
even-handed national application of Federal capital sentencing laws. Arbitrary or impermissible 
factors—such as a defendant’s race, ethnicity, or religion—will not inform any stage of the 
decision-making process.”); id. at § 9-10.130: 
National consistency requires treating similar cases similarly, when the only material 
difference is the location of the crime. Reviewers in each district are understandably most 
familiar with local norms or practice in their district and State, but reviewers must also take 
care to contextualize a given case within national norms or practice. For this reason, the multi-
tier process used to make determinations in this Chapter is carefully designed to provide 
reviewers with access to the national decision-making context, and thereby, to reduce 
disparities across districts. 
16. See Appendix 1: Death Authorizations and Sentences by Federal District [hereinafter 
Appendix 1], available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/issues/v085/docs/ (calculating 
authorizations from the Western District of Missouri (20), Eastern District of Virginia (39), District 
of Puerto Rico (22), District of Maryland (26), Central District of California (27), and Eastern 
District of New York (21) out of 461 total authorizations). The districts without any death-
authorizations are not listed.  
17. See id. (calculating authorizations of districts listed in the parenthetical to note 16 supra in 
addition to the District Court for the District of Columbia (17), Eastern District of Michigan (16), 
Western District of Virginia (13), Southern District of New York, Eastern District of Texas (12), 
Eastern District of Louisiana (10), Western District of Tennessee (9), and Southern District of 
Florida (9)).  
18. See id. (calculating death row inmates convicted in the Western District of Missouri (5), 
Eastern District of Virginia (4), Western District of Texas (3), Eastern District of Missouri (3), 
Northern District of Texas (3), Eastern District of Louisiana (3), and Eastern District of Texas(3) 
out of fifty-seven total inmates).  
19. Id. 
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not sought a death sentence.20 Fewer than 20% of federal districts have 
sentenced more than one person to death.21 
In 1994, Congress authorized the federal death penalty for a wide 
range of offenses, allowing it for every murder perpetrated with a 
firearm and that occurs during a crime of violence.22 Over ten thousand 
murders with a firearm occur in the United States each year.23 Yet, the 
government has charged only 2847 defendants with death-eligible 
federal crimes since 1988.24 United States Attorneys General have 
reviewed 2219 of these cases and have authorized death prosecutions 
against 460 defendants.25 Two-hundred two cases proceeded to a capital 
trial.26 Juries have returned death sentences against sixty-seven 
                                                     
20. Id. The districts that have not sought a death sentence to date are not listed. 
21. See id.  
22. 18 U.S.C. § 924(i) (1994) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 924(j) (2006)) provided the death 
penalty for murder committed by the use of a firearm during a crime of violence or a drug-
trafficking crime. See also Rory K. Little, What Federal Prosecutors Really Think: The Puzzle of 
Statistical Race Disparity Versus Specific Guilt, and the Specter of Timothy McVeigh, 53 DEPAUL 
L. REV. 1591, 1593 n.9 (2004) (“[T]he [death] penalty is now available for virtually any federal 
offense that includes a nonnegligent homicide.”). Though Congress resurrected the federal death 
penalty in 1988, see 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A)–(B) (1988), use of capital punishment at the federal 
level traditionally was reserved for offenses that occur on federal lands (or on the high seas), 
murders of a federal official, and killings involving espionage, hijacking, or kidnapping across state-
lines. See Rory Little, The Federal Death Penalty: History and Some Thoughts About the 
Department of Justice’s Role, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 347 (1999). 
23. See JAMES ALAN FOX & MARIANNE W. ZAWITZ, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, HOMICIDE TRENDS 
IN THE UNITED STATES 137 (2008), available at http://bjsdata.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/ 
pdf/htius.pdf.   
24. Declaration of Kevin McNally Regarding the Frequency of Federal Capital Prosecutions and 
the Race or Ethnic Background of Defendants, ¶ 6 (June 6, 2009) [hereinafter McNally Decl.], 
available at http://www.capdefnet.org/pdf_library/Frequency%20and%20Race-Ethnic%20Background 
%206-8-09.pdf. A version of this Declaration has been introduced in a series of cases. See, e.g., 
United States v. Rodriguez, 581 F.3d 775, 815 n.17 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v. Taylor, 583 F. 
Supp. 2d 923, 928 (E.D. Tenn. 2008) (“[McNally’s] knowledge appears to be obtained from 
reviewing documents or talking to individuals who may have been directly involved in the attorneys 
general decisions or the trials. For purposes of this Memorandum, the Court assumes this lack of 
direct or first hand knowledge would not serve as an impediment to the admissibility of his 
testimony if it was otherwise relevant or useful to the jury.”); United States v. Sablan, 2006 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 96150 (D. Colo. Apr. 18, 2006) (“According to the McNally Declaration, of the 2,227 
capital defendants eligible to receive the death penalty, only 18% of those, or 359 cases, have been 
selected for prosecution under the FDPA. Of those 359 cases, 47 defendants are currently serving 
death sentences, and three defendants have been executed. The relative infrequency with which the 
federal death penalty is imposed does not necessarily equate with arbitrariness.”). Those who 
believed that President Obama’s Justice Department would seek fewer death sentences have reason 
to expect to be disappointed. See Shapiro, supra note 14. 
25. McNally Decl., supra note 24, at ¶ 7. 
26. See Appendix 2: Defendant Profile and Status of Case by District at 2E–462E [hereinafter 
Appendix 2], available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/issues/v085/docs/. 
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defendants.27 Fifty-seven defendants remain on federal death row.28 The 
infrequency of the federal death penalty—with 67 federal death 
sentences in the face of over 150,000 murders—makes death by 
lightning-strike look positively routine.29 Indeed, a federal death 
sentence is akin to winning (or in this instance losing) the lottery. 
While there is no shortage of death-eligible murders in the United 
States each year, the number of murders in a particular location bears 
little relationship to the number of defendants from that jurisdiction who 
are sentenced to death federally. New York City had 596 homicides in 
2003.30 Chicago had 599.31 Los Angeles had just under 500.32 
Philadelphia had 348.33 The federal districts that encompass these four 
cities have sent a combined total of six defendants to federal death row 
since 1988.34 By contrast, the federal district that encompasses St. Louis 
(seventy-four murders in 200335) has sent three individuals to federal 
death row over that same time period.36 The Eastern District of 
                                                     
27. Thirteen defendants were acquitted. Two defendants received life sentences from a federal 
judge. One hundred twenty (120) defendants received life sentences from federal juries. See id; 
McNally Decl., supra note 24, at ¶7. 
28. See Appendix 1, supra note 16, at 69D. Three defendants were executed. Two death 
sentences were reversed on appeal. Two death sentences were reversed by a trial judge. Two 
defendants are pending re-trial. One defendant received clemency. McNally Decl., supra note 24, at 
¶ 7.  
29. There were 424 deaths by lightning in the years 1999–2008. NAT’L OCEANIC & 
ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., NUMBER OF LIGHTNING DEATHS BY STATE FROM 1999 TO 2008, at 4 
(2009), available at http://www.lightningsafety.noaa.gov/stats/99-08_deaths_by_state.pdf. See 
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309–10 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“These death sentences 
are cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual. For, of all 
the people convicted of rapes and murders in 1967 and 1968, many just as reprehensible as these, 
the petitioners are among a capriciously selected random handful upon whom the sentence of death 
has in fact been imposed.”) (footnotes omitted); see also id., at 310 (“My concurring Brothers have 
demonstrated that, if any basis can be discerned for the selection of these few to be sentenced to die, 
it is the constitutionally impermissible basis of race.”). 
30. See Chicago Topped Homicide Rates in 2003, USA TODAY, Jan. 1, 2004, http:// 
www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2004-01-02-city-murders_x.htm (last visited July 2, 2010).  
31. Id. 
32. Id.  
33. See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 
2003, at 116 (2004), available at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius_03/pdf/03sec2.pdf. 
34. Death Penalty Information Center, List of Prisoners, Federal Death Row Prisoners, 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/federal-death-row-prisoners (last visited June 28, 2010). 
35. Cheryl Wittenauer & Andale Gross, 2008 Deadly Year for St. Louis, Kansas City, 
MISSOURIAN, Jan. 2, 2009, http://www.columbiamissourian.com/stories/2009/01/02/2008-deadly-
year-st-louis-kansas-city/ (last visited July 2, 2010) 
36. See Appendix 1, supra note 16. For state prosecutions these geographic disparities are 
noteworthy, but perhaps not constitutionally relevant. However, the federal death penalty is pursued 
by a single sovereign and is unconstitutional as arbitrary if it depends more on where in the country 
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Louisiana, which encompasses New Orleans (275 murders in 200337), 
has also sent three individuals to federal death row.38 If the quantity of 
death-eligible federal crime does not explain the number of death 
sentences sought in a jurisdiction, then we must wonder what does 
explain the seemingly random distribution of federal death penalty 
prosecutions and sentences. 
Rather than chart these race and location disparities independently, 
this Article investigates the relationship between the two. Commentators 
pay ample attention to the roles played by the victim, the defendant, the 
judge, and the prosecutor in maintaining a racially and geographically 
skewed capital punishment.39 But we question here whether the federal 
death penalty “lottery” depends most on the racial make-up of the 
county where one “buys” their “ticket.” In other words, the physical 
space within which federal capital juries are constructed (either the 
county of offense in state cases or the federal district in federal cases) 
aggravates both the geographic and race disparities that plague the 
federal death penalty. Examining the districts with multiple federal death 
sentences against black defendants, we document a disquieting 
relationship between the racial geography of a county where an offense 
occurs, the demographics of the relevant federal district, and the 
likelihood that a federal capital defendant will receive a death sentence. 
Questions of vicinage—determining the geographic area from which 
a court draws twelve jurors—have been with us for over two hundred 
years.40 Our framing constitutional principle provides that the ultimate 
punishment should be judged by a narrow band of the defendant’s 
“equals and neighbors,”41 but the lawyer’s question to Jesus in Chapter 
10 of the Book of Luke remains—“who is my neighbor?”42 
                                                     
the offense occurred than on the type of crime the defendant committed or the kind of person the 
defendant is.  
37. Tara Young, How New Orleans Became the Nation’s Murder Capital: Cycle of Death, Hot 
Zone, NOLA.COM, Feb. 9, 2009, http://www.nola.com/speced/cycleofdeath/index.ssf?/speced/ 
cycleofdeath/hotzone.html (last visited July 2, 2010). 
38. See Appendix 1, supra note 16. 
39. See generally Stephen B. Bright, Discrimination, Death and Denial: The Tolerance of Racial 
Discrimination in Infliction of the Death Penalty, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 433 (1995); Stephen B. 
Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death: Deciding Between the Bill of Rights 
and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REV. 759 (1995). 
40. See infra Part V.  
41. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 151–52 (1968) (“But the founders of the English law 
have, with excellent forecast, contrived that . . . the truth of every accusation, whether preferred in 
the shape of indictment, information, or appeal, should afterwards be confirmed by the 
unanimous suffrage of twelve of his equals and neighbours, indifferently chosen and superior to all 
suspicion.”) (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted); see also United States v. Booker, 
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Part I begins with an overview of race issues in the administration of 
the federal death penalty. Part II explains the concept of vicinage and 
examines the historical and racial relationships between place and the 
ability to seat an impartial jury. In Part III, we focus on the demography 
of the small band of jurisdictions that have returned the vast majority of 
federal death sentences. This examination reveals that a disproportionate 
number of federal death sentences are located in districts where the 
decision to prosecute federally transformed the jury pool from 
predominantly black to predominantly white. In Part IV, we explain that 
juror race does matter and impacts verdict outcomes.  Part V examines 
race as a proxy for other shared community values that shift as the jury 
pool crosses county lines. We conclude, in Part VI, by proposing three 
possible solutions: (1) a simple, democracy-enhancing fix through a 
return to the historical conception of the county as the place of vicinage 
in federal capital trials; (2) a Batson-type three-step process for rooting 
out the influence of race on the decision to prosecute federally; and (3) a 
voluntary measure by the Attorney General to mask demographic and 
location identifiers when deciding whether to provide federal death-
authorization. 
I. BLACKS ARE DISPROPORTIONATELY IMPACTED BY 
FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY PROSECUTION, ESPECIALLY 
IN COUNTIES DEMOGRAPHICALLY DIFFERENT FROM 
THE SURROUNDING FEDERAL DISTRICT 
“He uses statistics as a drunken man uses lamp posts—for support rather 
than for illumination.” 
 
—Andrew Lang43 
 
A decade ago the United States Department of Justice issued a report 
analyzing the government’s use of the federal death penalty from 
Congress’ enactment of the death penalty statute in 1988 until 2000.44 
The study revealed at least three racial and ethnic disparities stark 
                                                     
543 U.S. 220 (2005); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
42. Luke 10:25–29. 
43. Andrew Lang quoted in ALAN L. MACKAY, SCIENTIFIC QUOTATIONS: THE HARVEST OF A 
QUIET EYE 91 (Maurice Ebison ed., 1977). 
44. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY SYSTEM: A STATISTICAL SURVEY 
(1988–2000) (Sept. 12, 2000), available at http://www.justice.gov/dag/pubdoc/dpsurvey.html. 
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enough to leave now-Attorney General Eric Holder “disturbed” and 
“troubled.” First, 80% of all cases in which a United States Attorney 
requested permission to seek the death penalty involved a minority 
group defendant. Second, 72% of the cases where the Attorney General 
authorized a capital prosecution involved minority group defendants. 
Third, United States Attorneys sought death-authorization twice as often 
in cases involving black defendants and non-black victims as in cases 
involving black defendants and black victims.45 President Clinton called 
these disparities “astonishing.”46 The disparities also “sorely troubled” 
Attorney General Janet Reno, who, along with then-Deputy Attorney 
General Eric Holder, promised to compile data, find explanations, and 
root out bias.47 
President Bush took office in January 2001. He appointed John 
Ashcroft as his Attorney General. Ashcroft’s Department of Justice 
released a new report acknowledging that the statistics are correct; 
minority group defendants are overrepresented in death penalty 
prosecutions. 48 But the report concluded that this disparity is not due to 
racial or ethnic bias, but rather the reality that minority group defendants 
are overrepresented in the “pool of potential federal capital cases.”49 In 
fact, according to the report, when shifting focus to the death-
authorization rate among death-eligible federal minority group 
defendants, black and Hispanic defendants are less likely to be selected 
for federal capital prosecution: “[T]he Attorney General ultimately 
decided to seek the death penalty for 27% of the white defendants (44 
out of 166), 17% of the black defendants (71 out of 408), and 9% of the 
Hispanic defendants (32 out of 350).”50 
Attorney General Ashcroft’s reconfiguration of the statistical analysis 
was flawed. By looking solely at death-authorized defendants and not 
attempting to appreciate how or why black defendants were over-
represented in the pool of federal defendants, Ashcroft’s approach was 
                                                     
45. Id.; see also Death Penalty Information Center, The Federal Death Penalty System: A 
Statistical Survey (1988–2000): A Summary of the Report on the Federal Death Penalty by the 
Death Penalty Information Center, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/dpic-summary-quotthe-federal-
death-penalty-sytem-statistical-surveyquot#race (last visited June 28, 2010). 
46. Michelle Mittlestadt, Sizable Racial Disparity Found in Federal Death-Penalty Cases, 
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 13, 2000, at 3A.  
47. Lacey & Bonner, supra note 1. 
48. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY SYSTEM: SUPPLEMENTARY DATA, 
ANALYSIS AND REVISED PROTOCOLS FOR CAPITAL CASE REVIEW 10 (June 6, 2001), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/dag/pubdoc/deathpenaltystudy.htm. 
49. Id. 
50. Id.  
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akin to checking the back of the bus to see whether blacks were being 
discriminated against, and determining that no discrimination existed 
because blacks were over-represented as bus-riders.51 And so the 
Ashcroft Report met swift criticism. Professor David Baldus sent a 
statement to Senator Russell Feingold reporting that the Ashcroft Report 
“utterly fails to convince me that there is no significant risk of racial 
unfairness and geographic arbitrariness in the administration of the 
federal death penalty.”52 Baldus observed however, the relevant 
unanswered question: the representativeness of racial minorities in the 
broader pool of murder defendants, and whether bias occurs at the point 
where United States Attorneys decide whether and how to charge 
murder defendants.53 
But Professor Baldus’ statement and both the Reno and Ashcroft 
reports failed to consider another cause of race bias in the administration 
of the federal death penalty: the exploitation of demographically 
chiaroscurist jury pools. Most federally-prosecuted capital crimes occur 
in minority-concentrated areas.54 Thus, expansion of the venire to the 
federal district level (which often includes white-flight suburbs) has a 
dramatic effect on the circumstance of the prosecution.55 Moving the 
relevant “community” from the county to the federal district dilutes the 
voice of the population impacted most by violent crime.56 Moreover, as 
the jury pools get whiter, the opportunity for implicit race bias increases 
(and minority group defendants suffer the consequences).57 Far from 
considering the influence of racialized jury pools as a potential cause of 
                                                     
51. Chief Justice Krivosha of the Nebraska Supreme Court described the flaws in such an 
approach:  
If one wants to determine whether individuals are being discriminated against in public 
transportation, one does not merely look at those who are required to sit at the back of the bus 
and conclude that since everyone in the back of the bus looks alike, there is no discrimination. 
One, of necessity, must look at who is riding in the front of the bus as well in order to 
determine whether persons in the back are being discriminated against. So, too there is no way 
that we can determine whether those who are sentenced to death are being discriminated 
against if we do not examine those cases having the same or similar circumstances which, for 
whatever reason, did not result in the imposition of death. 
State v. Palmer, 399 N.W.2d 706, 752 (Neb. 1986) (Krivosha, C.J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
52. Statement of David C. Baldus, Professor of Law, University of Iowa, to Russell D. Feingold, 
Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate (June 11, 2001), available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo. 
org/node/86.  
53. Id. 
54. See infra Part III.  
55. See infra Part III. 
56. See infra Part III. 
57. See infra Part IV.D. 
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race bias in the administration of the federal death penalty, neither the 
Reno nor the Ashcroft reports even mentioned the stark geography of 
race that results from federal death penalty prosecutions. 
Neither the Baldus investigation nor the DOJ reports explain why the 
vast majority of the federal death sentences come from a narrow band of 
jurisdictions. While there are ninety-four federal jurisdictions,58 forty-
three (75%) death sentences have come from sixteen districts; and just 
nine districts have returned nearly half (twenty-nine) of the death 
sentences:59 
 
Federal Districts with Most Death Sentences Since 198860 
Federal Jurisdiction Death Sentences 
Western District of Missouri  5 
Eastern District of Virginia  4 
Eastern District of Louisiana 3 
Eastern District of Missouri 3 
Western District of Texas 3 
Eastern District of Oklahoma 3 
Northern of District of Texas 3 
Eastern District of Texas 3 
District of Maryland 2 
TOTAL 29 
 
For example, one wonders how Missouri—with eight federal death 
sentences between its two districts—has returned more federal death 
sentences than New York, California, Florida, and the thirty-seven 
federal districts that have never returned a federal death penalty, 
combined.61 When a disproportionately large number of federal death 
sentences come from a narrow band of jurisdictions—even though there 
is supposed to be federal oversight from the Attorney General to avoid 
the arbitrary imposition of the death penalty—focused attention on the 
demographics of these jurisdictions is warranted. Eight jurisdictions 
have returned more than two death sentences, resulting in almost half of 
                                                     
58. 28 U.S.C. §§ 81–144 (2006). The U.S. Courts website contains a helpful map of the 94 
federal judicial districts, which is available at http://www.uscourts.gov/images/CircuitMap.pdf. 
59. See Appendix 1, supra note 16.  
60. See id.  
61. See id. 
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the defendants on death row.62 The eight federal districts that have 
returned more than two death sentences are not exclusively white 
jurisdictions, nor are they jurisdictions with predominantly black or 
other minority group populations.63 However, what is striking about 
these jurisdictions is that the county of the offense generally has a high 
percentage of blacks, but is located within federal districts which are 
heavily white.64 
We focus in Part III on the impact that the expansion of the venire has 
on the operation of the death penalty in the districts that have returned 
the majority of federal death sentences. This focus demonstrates that no 
assessment of the federal death penalty can be sufficient without an 
understanding of why death sentences come disproportionately from 
racially-divided districts. But before addressing the demographic shift 
that occurs in this small band of districts that have returned multiple 
death sentences, it is important to identify the historical link between the 
jury and the county of offense, and the racial issues that emerge in the 
shift to expand the venire to a district level. 
II. COUNTY-LEVEL JURIES, AS OPPOSED TO JURIES DRAWN 
FROM THE ENTIRE FEDERAL DISTRICT, MAINTAIN THE 
LINK BETWEEN COMMUNITY VALUES AND THE 
IMPOSITION OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 
A. Historically, the Link Between the Sentencing Jury and the County 
of the Offense Was an Essential Component of the Fair Trial 
Guarantee 
Anglo-American common law is rooted in the belief that a defendant 
should be tried by representatives of the community in which the crime 
was committed, by neighbors and equals of the defendant—the vicinage 
presumption.65 The Sixth Amendment protects the right to vicinage in 
criminal cases, but sketches only the outer limits of the constitutionally 
acceptable space from which a jury can be drawn.66 Within the outer 
limit—the federal judicial district previously ascertained by law—the 
                                                     
62. See id. 
63. See infra Part III.  
64. See infra Part III.  
65. See Steven A. Engel, The Public’s Vicinage Right: A Constitutional Argument, 75 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1658, 1660–61 (2000). 
66. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“[T]he accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by 
an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which 
district shall have been previously ascertained by law . . . .”). 
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precise area depends upon the impact the chosen geographic scope has 
on the right to an impartial trial and the right of the impacted community 
to be a stakeholder in the justice process. 
At the nation’s founding, the relevant community in federal capital 
cases was the county where the crime occurred.67 Today, federal capital 
juries are generally drawn from the entire federal district that 
encompasses the county where the crime occurred.68 This is not an 
innocuous geographical shift, but rather one that results in robust 
demographic, experiential, political, and attitudinal changes in the 
community assigned to determine if a particular person deserves death. 
The ability to receive an impartial trial has always been tethered to 
place, and a conception of “neighbors” imposing justice. Though the 
location of the crime consistently serves as the epicenter for determining 
the geographic area from which jurors can be summoned, the outer 
bounds of the physical space encasing the location of the crime is elastic. 
At its narrowest expanse, in medieval England, jurors were summoned 
from the neighborhood where the crime occurred.69 Pulling jurors from 
the neighborhood meant the jurors were more likely to know information 
related to the character of parties and witnesses. This “local knowledge” 
allowed jurors to assess the credibility of both witnesses and evidence. 
But the benefit of local knowledge came at the cost of increased risk of 
passion and prejudice. Gradually England began to summon jurors from 
the “county at large.”70 By pulling from the entire county, jurors would 
still possess local knowledge and community values, but would be less 
likely to be prejudiced by knowledge of the particular parties or events 
in question. 
Vicinage crossed the ocean with the English and settled in the 
Colonies. On March 5, 1770, five insult-slinging, snowball-throwing 
Bostonians died after provoking the anger of five gun-wielding, trigger-
                                                     
67. See Engle, supra note 65 at 1679–85.  
68. But see 18 U.S.C. § 3235 (2006) (“The trial of offenses punishable with death shall be had in 
the county where the offense was committed, where that can be done without great 
inconvenience.”).   
69. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, *350–51 (T. Cooley 4th ed. 1899) (noting 
requirement that sheriff return jurors from “the visne or neighbourhood; which is interpreted to be 
of the county where the fact is committed.”); see 1 EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE 
INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 125.a. (Francis Hargrave & Charles Butler eds., 19th ed. 
1853); 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, 654–62 
§§ 1775–1785 (1833); MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY AND ANALYSIS OF THE COMMON LAW OF 
ENGLAND 263 (1713).  
70. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 2.  
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happy British officers.71 A grand jury returned murder indictments 
against the five officers. Despite the extreme sentiments swirling around 
Boston—this would later be dubbed the “Boston Massacre”—the trial 
took place in Boston and local jurors were summoned.72 Most of the 
defendants were acquitted on most of the charges.73 The Crown got word 
of the local trials against the officers, and, in 1774, declared that all 
future trials of British officers would take place in England.74 The 
colonists dubbed this dislocation of trial from the place of offense an 
“Intolerable Act.”75 John Adams, one of the defense attorneys for the 
officers, helped pen the Declaration of Independence, which referred to 
the proposed off-site trials of British officers as a “Mock Trial” regime.76 
Though Article III establishes the state of offense as the outside 
territorial boundary for where a federal criminal trial could take place,77 
the United States Constitution does not expressly grant an independent 
vicinage right. Noting the absence of an express vicinage clause in the 
Constitution, James Madison introduced the following proposed 
amendment to what would become the Sixth Amendment: “The trial of 
all crimes . . . shall be by an impartial jury of freeholders of the vicinage, 
with the requisite of unanimity for conviction, of the right of challenge, 
and other accustomed requisites . . . .”78 The proposed amendment 
passed the House, but emerged from the Senate (and the subsequent 
Conference Committee) without the vicinage language. 
The Senate believed that the Judiciary Act of 1789 would adequately 
preserve common law vicinage rights, and thus, a constitutional 
amendment to the same effect would be extravagant.79 A letter from 
James Madison to Edmund Pendleton, dated September 23, 1789, 
provides further insight: 
The vicinage they contend is either too vague or too strict a 
term; too vague if depending on limits to be fixed by the 
                                                     
71. See Akhil Amar, A Tale of Two Cities, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/ 
20000501_amar.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2009). 
72. Id. 
73. Id.  
74. Id.  
75. Id.  
76. Id. 
77. See U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2 (providing that trial shall be by jury, and take place in the state 
of the offense). 
78. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 94 (1970) (quoting 1 Annals of Cong. 435 (1789)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
79. Id. at 94–95. 
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pleasure of the law, too strict if limited to the county. It was 
proposed to insert after the word Juries, ‘with the accustomed 
requisites,’ leaving the definition to be construed according to 
the judgment of professional men. Even this could not be 
obtained . . . . The Senate suppose, also, that the provision for 
vicinage in the Judiciary bill will sufficiently quiet the fears 
which called for an amendment on this point.80 
The fear that the vicinage right would be too narrow if delimited by the 
county had to do with the difference in size between an English county 
and a United States county. In England, the population of the average 
county totaled 180,000 people.81 The average American county had 
13,656 residents.82 The underlying political concern driving the anxiety 
over equating vicinage with the relatively small size of the American 
county was the fear that Anti-Federalists would rebel, be tried by their 
friends and neighbors from their home counties, and thus get away with 
treason.83 Another factor that influenced the decision not to freeze 
vicinage into the Constitution was the evolving role of the American 
jury: jurors were now required to base convictions solely on the 
independent weight of the evidence introduced into the trial (rather than 
local knowledge or the moral leanings of the jurors).84 This shift meant 
that the functional role of the community-level juror (e.g., bringing the 
“conscience of the community” or local knowledge to bear on guilt 
determinations) became increasingly less relevant. 
It is important to note here that the impartial jury right still depended 
on place. But because of the changing role of the jury and the limited 
size of the American county, among other factors, the minimum 
geographic area from which to summon jurors had expanded. The 
relevant geographic area, as preserved by the Sixth Amendment, is the 
“State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which 
district shall have been previously ascertained by law . . . .”85 Congress 
created federal districts to be generally co-extensive with the territorial 
boundaries of the state. Because a majority of the states pulled jurors 
from the entire state, the newly established federal districts aligned with 
                                                     
80. Letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph (Sept. 23, 1789), quoted in Williams, 399 
U.S. at 95–96.  
81. Brian C. Kalt, Crossing Eight Mile: Juries of the Vicinage and County-Line Criminal Buffer 
Statutes, 80 WASH. L. REV. 271, 300 n.99 (2005). 
82. Id.  
83. Drew L. Kershen, Vicinage, 29 OKLA. L. REV. 801, 824 (1976). 
84. Id. at 835.  
85. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  
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state practice. But keep two things in mind: First, the population of the 
average state was slightly larger than the population of the average 
county in England.86 So the population density of the “vicinage” meshed 
with the English practice. Second, under the Judiciary Act of 1789, 
federal judges retained discretion in non-capital trials to draw jurors 
from a narrower community (including the county level) should that be 
necessary to obtain an impartial jury.87 
The First Federal Congress enacted the Judiciary Act of 1789 just two 
years after the signing of the Constitution (and one day before Congress 
submitted the Bill of Rights to state legislatures).88 Section 29 of the 
Judiciary Act guaranteed that federal capital trials “shall be had in the 
county where the offence was committed, or where that cannot be done 
without great inconvenience, twelve petit jurors at least shall be 
summoned from thence.”89 This deviation from the general 
unwillingness to equate vicinage with the county is not a historical 
accident, but rather reflects the understanding that in the most serious 
cases, where both the defendant and the impacted community have the 
most on the line, the best practice is to locate the trial as close as 
possible to the location of the crime. 
From 1789 until 1862, the right to a jury (or at least twelve petit 
jurors) from the county of the offense in capital cases remained part of 
Section 29.90 However, in 1862, upon a confusing and un-debated 
motion by a Connecticut congressman to repeal the portion of Section 29 
that requires twelve petit jurors to be summoned from the county of 
offense, Congress dropped the requirement.91 But the ease of the repeal 
effort does not warrant the conclusion that no weighty purpose drove the 
                                                     
86. See Kalt, supra note 81, at 300.  
87. Judiciary Act of 1789, § 29, 1 Stat. 73, 88 (“[J]urors . . . shall be returned as there shall be 
occasion for them, from such parts of the district from time to time as the court shall direct, so as 
shall be most favourable to an impartial trial . . . .”).  
88. Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. 
REV. 49, 49 (1923) (“The Federal Judiciary Act of September 24, 1789, was Senate Bill No. 1, in 
the First Session of the First Congress.”). 
89. Judiciary Act of 1789, § 29, 1 Stat. at 88; see also Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 
108 (1807) (“So by the 29th section of the judiciary act of 1789 . . . in all cases punishable with 
death, the trial shall be had in the county where the offence was committed, or where that cannot be 
done, without great inconvenience, twelve petit jurors, at least, shall be summoned from 
thence . . . .”); United States v. Insurgents of Pennsylvania, 3 U.S. (Dall.) 513, 513 (1799) (“In cases 
punishable with death, the trial shall be had in the county where the offence was committed, or 
where that cannot be done, without great inconvenience, twelve petit jurors at least shall be 
summoned from thence.”). 
90. Drew L. Kershen, Vicinage, 30 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 56 (1977).  
91. Id. at 57.  
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motion to repeal the “12 petit jurors from the county of offense rule.” 
Northerners, again concerned about the ability of county-level Southern 
juries to return treason verdicts against would-be secessionists, wanted 
the county-level juror requirement removed so that a more diverse jury 
could be drawn from the entire federal district.92 
Reconstruction reinforced the need for a broader geographic area 
from which to summon petit jurors. A trend in the administration of 
Southern criminal justice emerged following the completion of the Civil 
War: all-white juries consistently (over-) punished black defendants, but 
refused to punish white defendants who harmed black victims.93 
Realizing that hard-won equality under the law was being lost in 
countless courthouses throughout the South, Congress passed the Ku 
Klux Klan Act of 1871, which gave federal prosecutors the ability to 
charge these racially antagonistic crimes in federal court.94 Armed with 
the Act of 1871, the federal government mobilized quickly to South 
Carolina, a state gripped by particularly savage and widespread race-
motivated violence.95 
On March 6, 1871, forty-odd members of the Ku Klux Klan initiated 
a “savage rampage” against blacks in York County, South Carolina and 
their Republican counterparts.96 In response to this uprising, and the 
lynching of James Rainey, an officer in an all-black militia, in particular, 
President Grant ordered federal troops and federal prosecutors into 
South Carolina. Defense attorneys representing the suspects arrested in 
connection with the March 6 rampage moved for the federal court to 
draw jurors solely from the locality where the crime had occurred.97 The 
federal judge denied the motion and drew the jury pool from the entire 
federal district. Senator Coburn explained the rationale for broadening 
the geographic scope of the jury pool beyond the location where the 
crime occurred: 
The United States courts are further above mere local influence 
than the county courts; their judges can act with more 
independence, cannot be put under terror, as local judges can; 
their sympathies are not so nearly identified with those of the 
vicinage; the jurors are taken from the State, and not the 
                                                     
92. Id. at 58–59. 
93. James Forman, Jr., Juries and Race in the Nineteenth Century, 113 YALE L.J. 895, 909–10 
(2004). 
94. Ku Klux Klan Act, 17 Stat. 13 (1871).  
95. Forman, supra note 93, at 924. 
96. Id. 
97. Id.  
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neighborhood; they will be able to rise above prejudices or bad 
passions or terror more easily. The marshal, clothed with more 
power than the sheriff, can make arrests with certainty, and, with 
the aid of the General Government, can seize offenders in spite 
of any banded and combined resistance such as may be 
expected.98 
This initial effort to ensure that blacks had legal protection from 
lynchings and vigilante violence would ultimately be transformed into a 
mechanism that subjected black defendants to all-white or 
predominantly white juries. 
B. Shifting Demographics Have Transformed the Expanded Venire 
from a Shield Against Racism Into a Trap that Exploits It 
While the expansion of the venire was initially promulgated to protect 
the rights of minorities, specifically blacks, over time the expansion of 
the venire has reduced the protections provided by a jury of “equals and 
neighbors.” Over the more than one hundred years from Reconstruction 
through today, the result of racial equality efforts and enforcement (and 
particularly the integration of public schools) has led to an 
unprecedented migration of white citizens from inner-city areas into 
peripheral suburbs. In major cities across the United States (and 
especially in the South), the white citizens who left the city took much of 
the wealth with them, leaving pockets of cities that suffer from 
concentrated poverty and the attendant evils that come with that reality. 
Take New Orleans, for example.99  
In the wake of the civil rights movement in the 1960s, white New 
Orleans residents began to flee the city (which is located in Orleans 
Parish) and relocate to Metairie (which is part of neighboring Jefferson 
                                                     
98. Robert D. Goldstein, Blyew: Variations on a Jurisdictional Theme, 41 STAN. L. REV. 469, 
509 (1989). The wider geographic scope from which the jury pool was drawn, combined with the 
provision of the Ku Klax Klan Act that required prospective jurors to swear an oath of non-
affiliation with Klan activity, led to juries with a disproportionately high number of black citizens. 
Overall, “two-thirds of all the petit jurors were black, with no Klansman tried by a jury that was 
majority white.” Forman, supra note 93, at 925. 
99. As of 2006, 22.2% of New Orleans residents lived below the poverty line (30.6% of blacks 
compared to 9% of white). WILLIAM H. FREY, AUDREY SINGER & DAVID PARK, BROOKINGS INST., 
RESETTLING NEW ORLEANS: THE FIRST FULL PICTURE FROM THE CENSUS 11(2007), 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/reports/2007/07katrinafreysinger/20070912_katrinafrey
singer.pdf. 
Thirty-eight percent (38%) of children in New Orleans live below the poverty line. SARAH FASS & 
NANCY K. CAUTHEN, NAT’L CTR. FOR CHILDREN IN POVERTY, CHILD POVERTY IN STATES HIT BY 
HURRICANE KATRINA 1 (2005), available at http://nccp.org/publications/pdf/text_622.pdf. These 
numbers render New Orleans among the poorest of large cities in America.  
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Parish).100 As a federal district court judge sitting in the Eastern District 
of Louisiana observed: “The historical record of discrimination in 
the . . . Parish of Jefferson is undeniably clear, and the record suggests it 
has not ended even now.”101 Until at least 1963, “Jefferson Parish 
blacks, unlike whites, were required . . . to state their age exactly in 
terms of number of years, months and days, and to recite the preamble to 
the United States Constitution in order to register to vote.”102 Until at 
least the mid-1970s, “[b]lacks were systematically denied access to 
restaurants, forced to sit in the rear of buses and subjected to separate 
and unequal facilities.”103 Education services provided to black children 
were “qualitatively inferior to those provided to whites.”104   
Jefferson Parish voters elected David Duke, former Ku Klux Klan 
Grand Wizard and founder of the National Association for the 
Advancement of White People, to the state legislature in 1989.105 Duke 
carried Jefferson Parish in his (unsuccessful) 1990 bid for the United 
States Senate106 and received 41% of the Jefferson Parish vote when he 
ran for Governor in 1991.107 
In 1994, in response to a black suspect dying after being improperly 
restrained by the Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s Office, Sheriff Harry Lee 
removed police units from a black neighborhood in the parish. His 
rationale: “To hell with them . . . I haven’t heard one word of support 
from one black person.”108 Because “[i]f you live in a predominantly 
white neighborhood and two blacks are in a car behind you, there’s a 
pretty good chance they’re up to no good,” Sheriff Lee ordered his 
deputies to stop and question all blacks in “rinky-dink car[s].”109 After 
ordering the construction of a barricade between Orleans and Jefferson 
                                                     
100. See, e.g., Brief of Nine Jefferson Parish Ministers as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 
15, Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472 (2008) (No. 06-10119) [hereinafter Brief of Ministers] (citing 
James Brandt & Robert K. Whelan, New Orleans: Metropolis Against Itself, in METROPOLITAN 
GOVERNANCE WITHOUT METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT 135 (Donald Phares, ed. 2004)). 
101. Citizens for a Better Gretna v. City of Gretna, 636 F. Supp. 1113, 1116 (E.D. La. 1986). 
102. Id. at 1117. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. at 1118. 
105. Brief of Ministers, supra note 100, at 17 (citing Frances Frank Marcus, Winner in Louisiana 
Vote Takes on G.O.P. Chairman, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1989, at A1).  
106. Id.  
107. David Meeks, An Ill-Conceived Business Boycott, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Nov. 24, 1991, at B7.  
108. Brief of Ministers, supra note 100, at 17 n.29.  
109. J. Michael Kennedy, Sheriff Rescinds Order to Stop Blacks in White Areas, L.A. TIMES, 
Dec. 4, 1986, at 18, available at http://articles.latimes.com/1986-12-04/news/mn-1380_1_white-
area. 
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to keep black New Orleans citizens out of Jefferson, Sheriff Lee returned 
to the segregation theme in the midst of Hurricane Katrina. He ordered 
deputies to stand at the bridge connecting Orleans and Jefferson, and to 
point assault weapons at the New Orleans residents (the vast majority of 
whom were black) trying to escape the flooded city.110 Sheriff Lee died 
in 2007, but he managed to spark one last controversy shortly before his 
death, announcing his new violent crime policy: “We’re only stopping 
black people.”111 
Jefferson Parish, Louisiana serves as a paradigmatic example of the 
demographic changes that we must consider when evaluating the 
relationship between the place of the crime and the ability to obtain an 
impartial jury. Whereas Reconstruction considerations required an 
expanded geographic scope of the vicinage in order to obtain an 
impartial jury, the current practice of drawing from the entire federal 
district (rather than the county of offense) has the distinct feel of chasing 
after the devil. So, again, we ask, what community? While the decision 
to expand the venire beyond the county of offense appears to have had 
beneficent motivation, it currently operates to racialize the decision to 
prosecute federally. Without the expansion of the venire, the decision to 
prosecute for murder in state or federal court has no racial significance; 
however, the expansion of the venire from the county of offense to the 
entire district means that the federal government’s decision to prosecute 
can have a significant demographic impact on the composition of the 
jury. 
III. DISTRICTS WITH THE HIGHEST DEATH SENTENCING 
RATES TEND TO BE COMPRISED OF A LARGELY BLACK 
COUNTY SURROUNDED BY LARGELY WHITE COUNTIES 
While the decision to prosecute federally rather than in state court has 
little or no difference on the jury demographics in many jurisdictions, it 
is highly significant in the federal judicial districts responsible for most 
of the black defendants on death row. In each of these districts, the 
county where the offense occurs has a high minority group population, 
but the overall composition of the federal district is heavily white. Thus, 
the shift to federal court results in a far whiter jury pool. We examine the 
demographic shift from county to district in four instances below. 
                                                     
110. Patrick Healey, Clinton Accepts Aid from a Divisive Figure, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2007, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/20/us/politics/20commence.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2010).  
111. Adam Nossiter, Harry Lee, Outspoken Louisiana Sheriff, Dies at 75, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 
2007, at B6, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/02/us/02lee.html. 
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A. Orleans Parish (New Orleans) and the Eastern District of 
Louisiana 
Orleans is a majority-minority group parish. According to 2008 
federal census data, nearly 62% of the population of Orleans Parish is 
black and about 34% is white.112 Orleans Parish juries have sentenced 
only one person to death in the past twelve years.113 This is not for lack 
of opportunity: New Orleans consistently leads the nation in the 
infamous “most murders per capita” category, with 64 per 100,000 
people in 2008.114 Comparing Orleans to Jefferson Parish (its neighbor 
and second most populous parish in the Eastern District) is telling. In 
Jefferson during the same period (1998–2009) ten out of the fourteen 
cases to proceed to a capital trial (71%) resulted in death sentences.115 
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana 
has jurisdiction over federal capital trials held in connection with crimes 
that occur in Orleans Parish.116 The United States Attorney General has 
authorized federal death penalty prosecutions against ten defendants 
within the Eastern District of Louisiana.117 All ten defendants authorized 
for federal capital prosecutions were charged with murders that occurred 
within the confines of Orleans Parish.118 All ten are either black or 
                                                     
112. U.S. Census Bureau, State & County QuickFacts, Orleans Parish, Louisiana, 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/22/22071.html (last visited June 30, 2010) (noting 61.8% 
black and 33.9% white). 
113. On August 30, 2009, an Orleans Parish jury returned a death sentence against Michael 
Anderson, following his conviction for the first-degree murder of five teenagers. Orleans Parish 
Justice System Improving: Anderson Death Recommendation Is First Since 1997, WDSU, Aug. 30, 
2009, http://www.wdsu.com/news/20637947/detail.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2009). This 
conviction and death sentence was reversed based upon the trial court’s finding of a serious Brady 
violation. See Gwen Filosa, Judge Grants Michael Anderson New Trial in 2006 Central City 
Massacre Case, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Mar. 8, 2010, http://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/ 
2010/03/judge_grants_michael_anderson_new_trial.html (last visited July 1, 2010). 
114. Despite Drop in Crime, New Orleans’ Murder Rate Continues to Lead Nation, TIMES-
PICAYUNE, June 1, 2009, http://www.nola.com/news/index.ssf/2009/06/despite_drop_in_crime_ 
new_orle.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2009). 
115. Paul Purpura, Surge in Death Penalty Prosecutions Slows in Jefferson Parish, TIMES-
PICAYUNE, July 6, 2009, http://www.nola.com/news/index.ssf/2009/07/surge_in_capital_cases_ 
slows_i.html (last visited July 29, 2010). 
116. 28 U.S.C. § 98(a) (2006). 
117. See Appendix 2, supra note 26, at 152–161.  
118. See United States v. Davis, 380 F.3d 821, 823 (5th Cir. 2004) (discussing defendants Len 
Davis and Paul Hardy); Brief for the United States at *5, United States v. Green, 158 F.3d 583 (5th 
Cir. 1998) (Nos. 92-CR-468 & 96-CV-3188-H) (discussing defendants William Green and Oliver 
Brown); Brief for Appellant Richard Porter at *5–7, United States v. Porter, 124 F. App’x. 838 (5th 
Cir. July 6, 2004) (No. 03-30918) (discussing defendant Johnny Davis); Second Superseding 
Indictment for Conspiracy to Commit Armed Bank Robbery, Armed Bank Robbery Resulting in 
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Hispanic.119 Three defendants (out of the four whose cases proceeded to 
capital trials) received death sentences.120 All three are black.121 
Out of the hundreds of thousands of murders that were federally 
cognizable, and the fifty-seven that resulted in death sentences,122 how 
did three black men who committed murder in Orleans Parish end up on 
federal death row? The answer lies in the contrasting demographics of 
Orleans Parish and the rest of the Eastern District of Louisiana. If jury 
pool eligibility remains roughly consistent with the population of a 
parish, then a state prosecution for a crime committed in Orleans Parish 
would reflect a jury pool consisting of 62% black jurors and 34% white 
jurors.123 These numbers change dramatically when the case is 
prosecuted federally and the jury pool draws from the entire Eastern 
District of Louisiana.124 The Eastern District encompasses a population 
of 1,541,720.125 In Eastern District of Louisiana parishes (other than 
Orleans), 72% of the population is white and only 24% is black.126 
Overall, the population of the Eastern District (including Orleans Parish) 
is 64.4% white and 31.4% black.127 Federal prosecutors are able to dilute 
minority-concentrated populations (obtaining far whiter jury pools) 
simply by prosecuting the same case in federal rather than state court.128 
                                                     
Death and Violation of the Federal Firearms Act, United States v. Johnson, No. 04-CR-017 (E.D. 
La. Jan. 28, 2005) (discussing defendants Joseph Smith and John Johnson); see also Major Drug 
Ring Operated Out of B.W. Cooper, Feds Say, WDSU.COM, http://www.wdsu.com/ 
news/2422280/detail.html (last visited July 25, 2010) (discussing defendant Terrance Benjamin); 
United States v. Nelson, No. 02-CR-304 (E.D. La. Oct. 17, 2002); United States v. Pena, No. 97-
CR-145 (E.D. La. May 22, 1997). 
119. See Appendix 2, supra note 26, at 152G–161G. 
120. See id. at 154E, 155E, 160E. 
121. See id. at 154G, 155G, 160G. 
122. See supra note 112.  
123. See id.  
124. In one Eastern District case out of Orleans Parish, United States v. Johnson, 2010 WL 
1294058 (E.D.La. Mar. 29, 2010), only two jurors who sat on Johnson’s jury were from Orleans. 
Indeed, the Government used seven of its peremptory strikes to remove jurors from Orleans. Note 
that one of the authors of this Article is counsel for Johnson. 
125. See Appendix A: Demographics of the Eastern District of Louisiana at 16B [hereinafter 
Appendix A], available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/issues/v085/docs/. 
126. See id. at 18D, 18F.  
127. Id. at 16D, 16F. The population of Orleans Parish is 311,853, see id. at 5B, and contains 
33.9% white and 61.8% black residents. Id. at 5D, 5F. 
128. The Eastern District of Louisiana is not only racially imbalanced, but it provides a locus at 
the height of racial tension. See, e.g., Brief of Ministers, supra note 100 at 15–18 (describing 
modern history of race tensions in Jefferson Parish, Louisiana, including the election of former Ku 
Klux Klan Grand Wizard David Duke as a state representative); Suzanne Le Breton, Trial Begins 
for Alleged KKK Wizard, ST. TAMMANY NEWS, May 5, 2010, http://www.thesttammanynews.com/ 
articles/2010/05/09/news/doc4be0a1b3e3d4c610486902.txt (last visited Aug. 3, 2010); Mary Foster, 
 
082610 Smith Cohen Final.docx (Do Not Delete) 8/30/2010  8:04 AM 
448 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:425 
 
  
                                                     
Interracial Couple Denied Marriage License in Tangipahoa Parish, NOLA.COM, Oct. 16, 2009, 
http://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/2009/10/interracial_couple_denied_marr.html (last visited 
Aug. 3, 2010).  
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B. St. Louis, Missouri and the Eastern District of Missouri 
The city of St. Louis has a population of 356,587.129 About half 
(48.9%) of the city’s residents are black and 47.2% are white.130 Only 
four people (out of forty-nine) on Missouri’s death row were convicted 
in St. Louis city.131 St. Louis juries have returned only one death 
sentence since 2000.132 Again, this is not for lack of violent crime. St. 
Louis trails only New Orleans in the competition for worst per capita 
murder rate.133 Saint Louis County neighbors St. Louis city. Saint Louis 
County is 73.4% white, 21.8% black,134 and has a population of 
992,408.135 Saint Louis County juries sentenced to death seventeen of 
the forty-nine death row inmates in Missouri.136 
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri 
has jurisdiction over federally prosecuted crimes committed in St. 
Louis.137 The Eastern District of Missouri has a population of 
2,910,039.138 Overall, the Eastern District is 81.8% white and 15.5% 
black.139 The Eastern Division (“Saint Louis Division”) of the Eastern 
District of Missouri draws jurors from fifteen counties and the city of St. 
Louis.140 The Saint Louis Division has a population of 2,330,358 and is 
                                                     
129. U.S. Census Bureau, State & County QuickFacts, St. Louis city, Missouri, http:// 
quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/29/29510.html (last visited Aug. 14, 2010) (2009 estimate).  
130. U.S. Census Bureau, State & County QuickFacts, St. Louis city, Missouri, http:// 
quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/29/29510.html (last visited Aug. 3, 2010) (2008 estimate). 
131. See Missouri Death Row, Current Inmates, http://missourideathrow.com/current-inmates/ 
(last visited July 4, 2010) (listing inmates by place of offense). 
132. Missouri Death Row, Executions: 1989–2009, http://missourideathrow.com/current-inmates 
(last visited Jan. 12, 2010) (listing executions by place of offense).  
133. Brendan McCarthy, Police Chief Calls New Orleans Top Murder Rank Misleading, TIMES-
PICAYUNE, June 3, 2009, http://www.nola.com/news/index.ssf/2009/06/police_chief_calls_new_ 
orleans.html (last visited July 4, 2010) (“St. Louis [city] has the nation’s second-highest rate, about 
47 murders per 100,000 people.”). 
134. See U.S. Census Bureau, State & County QuickFaccts, St. Louis County, Missouri, 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/29/29819.html (last visited Aug. 3, 2010) (2008 estimate). 
135. U.S. Census Bureau, State & County QuickFacts, St. Louis County, Missouri, http:// 
quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/29/29189.html (last visited Aug. 14, 2010). 
136. See supra note 132.  
137. 28 U.S.C. § 105(a)(1) (2006). 
138. See Appendix B: Demographics of the Eastern District of Missouri, at 52B [hereinafter 
Appendix B], available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/issues/v085/docs/. 
139. See id. at 52D, 52F.; see also U.S. Census Bureau, State & County QuickFacts, Missouri, 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/29000.html (last visited June 29, 2010); FedStats.gov, 
Demographic and Economic Profile, Federal Judicial District: Missouri Eastern, http:// 
www.fedstats.gov/mapstats/demographic/fjd/45.html (last visited June 29, 2010). 
140. United States District Court Eastern District of Missouri, Jury—Frequently Asked 
Questions,http://www.moed.uscourts.gov/jury/Jury_FAQ.html#I_Dont_Live_In_The_City_-
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78.4% white and 17.9% black.141 Again assuming proportional minority 
representation in the population and jury pools, a St. Louis defendant 
who is charged federally will have barely one-third the percentage of 
black citizens (48.9% versus 17.9%) and roughly two-thirds more the 
percentage of white citizens (47.2% versus 78.4%) in the pool of 
potential jurors than if that defendant had been tried in state court. 
The United States Attorney General has authorized capital 
prosecutions against six individuals in the Eastern District of 
Missouri.142 All six defendants are black.143 All but one victim was 
white.144 The two defendants charged with killing the only black victim 
received life sentences from juries.145 One defendant pleaded guilty.146 
Three defendants from the Eastern District of Missouri are on federal 
death row.147 All three are black and committed murders in St. Louis 
against white victims.148 
                                                     
Why_Do_I_Have_To_Serve_There (last visited June 29, 2010). 
141. See Appendix B-2: Demographics of the Saint Louis Division of the Eastern District of 
Missouri [hereinafter Appendix B-2], available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/ 
issues/v085/docs/. The Saint Louis Division is comprised of fifteen counties and includes the city of 
Saint Louis. See U.S. Dist. Court, E.D. Missouri, http://www.moed.uscourts.gov/ 
clerksoffice/Counties.html (last visited July 4, 2010). 
142. See Appendix 1, supra note 16. 
143. See Appendix 2, supra note 27, at 211G–216G. 
144. Id. at 211I–216I. 
145. Id. at 214I–215I, 214E–215E. 
146. Id. at 211E. 
147. Id. at 212E, 213E, 216E. 
148. Id. at 212G, 212I,  213G, 213I, 216G, 216I; see also United States v. Allen, 406 F.3d 940, 
941 (8th Cir. 2005) (discussing defendants Billie Allen Jerome and Norris Holder); United States v. 
Bolden, 545 F.3d 609, 612 (8th Cir. 2008). 
082610 Smith Cohen Final.docx (Do Not Delete) 8/30/2010  8:04 AM 
452 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:425 
 
  
082610 Smith Cohen Final.docx (Do Not Delete) 8/30/2010  8:04 AM 
2010] RACIAL GEOGRAPHY OF THE FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY 453 
 
 
082610 Smith Cohen Final.docx (Do Not Delete) 8/30/2010  8:04 AM 
454 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:425 
 
C. Richmond and the Eastern District of Virginia 
The city of Richmond, Virginia has a population of 204,451.149 
Blacks comprise 52.2% of the population; whites comprise 44%.150 
Richmond suffered thirty-one homicides in 2008, which is roughly six 
times higher than the national murder rate.151 But only one of the eleven 
inmates currently on Virginia’s death row was sent there by a Richmond 
jury.152 By contrast, Prince William County, also in the Eastern District 
of Virginia, has three residents on Virginia’s death row, but has a 
population of 379,166 and had only twelve homicides in 2008.153 One 
major difference is the complexion of the jury pool. In contrast to the 
52.2% black population percentage in Richmond city, Prince William 
County has a black population percentage of 20.1% and a white 
population percentage of 69.2%.154 
A shift in population complexion is evident whenever a capital crime 
committed in Richmond is prosecuted federally. The Eastern District of 
Virginia, with a total population of 5,637,640, is 23.2% black and 67.9% 
white.155 Four defendants from the Eastern District of Virginia are on 
death row.156 All four are black.157 Three of the four death-sentenced 
defendants committed murder within Richmond city.158 The Eastern 
District is divided into four divisions, and murders committed in 
                                                     
149. U.S. Census Bureau, State & County QuickFacts, Richmond (city), Virginia, http:// 
quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/51/51760.html (last visited Aug. 14, 2010). 
150. Id.  
151. Criminal Justice Info. Serv. Div., Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 2008 Crime in the United 
States, http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2008/data/table_08_va.html (last visited Nov. 24, 2009). 
152. See Virginians for Alternatives to the Death Penalty, Virginia’s Death Row, 
http://www.vadp.org/death-row-inmate-profiles.html (last visited July 25, 2010). 
153. U.S. Census Bureau, State & County QuickFacts, Prince William County, Virginia, 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/51/51153.html (last visited Aug. 14, 2010); PRINCE WILLIAM 
COUNTY POLICE DEP’T, 2008 CRIME STATISTICS, available at http://www.pwcgov.org/ 
docLibrary/PDF/009958.pdf. 
154. U.S. Census Bureau, State & County QuickFacts, Prince William County, Virginia,http:// 
quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/51/51153.html (last visited June 14, 2010). 
155. See Appendix C: Demographics of the Eastern District of Virginia, at 66B, 66F, 66D 
[hereinafter Appendix C], available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/issues/v085/docs/; see 
U.S. Census Bureau, State & County QuickFacts, Virginia, http://quickfacts.census.gov/ 
qfd/states/51000.html (last visited July 2, 2010).  
156. See Appendix 2, supra note 26, at 402E, 403E, 405E, 438E. 
157. Id. at 402G, 403G, 405G, 438G. 
158. See United States v. Roane, 378 F.3d 382, 389 (4th Cir. 2004) (discussing Richmond city 
defendants Corey Johnson, James Roane, and Richard Tipton); United States v. Hager, 521 F. Supp. 
2d 533, 534 (E.D. Va. 2007) (noting crime committed in Alexandria, Virginia). 
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Richmond are prosecuted federally in the Richmond Division.159 The 
Richmond Division draws its jury pool from thirty-four counties and 
independent cities.160 The population of the Richmond Division is 
1,555,589 and is 66% white and 29.7% black.161 Thus, a capital jury in 
the Richmond Division is crafted from a population with far fewer black 
residents (29.7% versus 52.2%) and a far larger white population (66% 
versus 44%) than Richmond.162 
                                                     
159. See U.S. DIST. COURT E. DIST. OF VA., LOCAL RULES FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT 
COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA 2, available at http://www.vaed.uscourts.gov/ 
localrules/EDVALRMay2009.pdf. 
160. See id. 
161. See Appendix C-2: Demographics of the Richmond Division of the Eastern District of 
Virginia, at 37B, 37D, 37F, available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/issues/v085/docs/. 
162. Compare id. at 37F, 4F with id. at 37D, 4D. 
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D. Prince George’s County and the District of Maryland 
Other than the city of Baltimore, Prince George’s County has the 
highest percentage of black citizens in Maryland.163 Prince George’s 
County’s population totals 834,560. Nearly 66% of the citizens in Prince 
George’s County are black, while 28.1% are white.164 Prince George’s 
County juries have sent two defendants to death row since 1978.165 By 
contrast, Baltimore County, which is roughly the same size (789,814), 
but is 68.8% white and 25.1% black,166 has sent fourteen defendants to 
death row over the same time period.167 Notably, all fourteen defendants 
(six white, eight black) were sentenced to death for the murder of white 
victims.168 
The United States District Court for the District of Maryland 
encompasses a population of 5,699,478.169 Approximately 63% of the 
population in the District of Maryland is white.170 The black population 
equals 29.4%.171 United States Attorneys General have authorized the 
death penalty against twenty-six individuals in the District of 
Maryland.172 All twenty-six defendants are minority group members: 
twenty-three black and three Hispanic.173 Both federal death row inmates 
from the District of Maryland are black.174 Both committed crimes in 
Prince George’s County.175 The Southern Division (52.3% white and 
                                                     
163. See Appendix D: Demographics of the District of Maryland, available at 
http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/issues/v085/docs/. The City of Baltimore is an independent city 
in Maryland, and is thus the functional equivalent of a county.  
164. U.S. Census Bureau, State & County QuickFacts, Prince George’s County, Maryland, 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/24/24033.html (last visited July 2, 2010).  
165. See Case Maryland, Maryland Citizens Against State Executions, Maryland’s Death Row, 
http://www.mdcase.org/node/24 (last visited Nov. 24, 2009). Heath Burch is listed under “Current 
Death Row” and Jean Clermont is listed under “MD Inmates Removed from Death Row (Since 
1978).” Id.  
166. U.S. Census Bureau, State & County QuickFacts, Baltimore County, Maryland, 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/24/24005.html (last visited Aug. 14, 2010). 
167. See Case Maryland, Maryland Citizens Against State Executions, Maryland’s Death Row, 
http://www.mdcase.org/node/24 (last visited Nov. 24, 2009).  
168. Id. 
169. U.S. Census Bureau, State & County QuickFacts, Maryland, http://quickfacts.census.gov/ 
qfd/states/24000.html (last visited Aug. 14, 2010).  
170. Id.  
171. Id.  
172. See Appendix 1, supra note 16, at 16C. 
173. See Appendix 2, supra note 26, at 166G–191G. 
174. See id. at 170E, 179E. 
175. See United States v. Higgs, 353 F.3d 281, 288 (4th Cir. 2003); Matthew Dolan, Jurors OK 
Death in Pr. George’s Case, BALT. SUN., Nov. 11, 2005, http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2005-11-
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37.2% black176) of the District of Maryland handles federal crimes 
committed in Prince George’s County.177 Had these individuals been 
prosecuted in state court, they would have had a jury pulled from a 
population with roughly twice the representativeness of blacks (65.6% 
versus 37.2%)178 and half the representativeness of whites (28.1% versus 
52.3%).179 
                                                     
11/news/0511110140_1_george-county-hayes-prince-george (last visited July 25, 2010) (discussing 
Kenneth Lighty). 
176. See Appendix D-2: Demographics of the Southern Division of the District of Maryland, at 
8D, 8F [hereinafter Appendix D-2], available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/ 
issues/v085/docs/; see also U.S. Census Bureau, State & County QuickFacts, Maryland, 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/24000.html (last visited July 2, 1010). 
177. 28 U.S.C. § 100(2) (2006).  
178. See Appendix D-2, supra note 176, at 5F, 8F.  
179. Id. at 5D, 8D.  
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IV. DOES JUROR RACE MATTER? 
The demographic switch that results when death penalty cases are 
prosecuted federally tells us that a smaller percentage of black citizens 
are represented at the federal district level than in the county where most 
capital crimes occur. But that begs the question: Does juror race matter? 
Decisions from the United States Supreme Court, federal death penalty 
verdict outcomes, practical experience with jury selection, and 
experimental data rooted in implicit social cognition all suggest that 
juror race does matter in death penalty trials. 
A. The United States Supreme Court Is Divided Over Whether Juror 
Race Impacts Jury Deliberations 
The Court and its Justices have struggled for decades to reconcile the 
desire to eliminate racial barriers to inclusion with the commonsense 
notion that juror race impacts judgment.180 In fair cross-section cases, 
the Court consistently acknowledges that the exclusion of black jurors 
(or women jurors) deprives the defendant of a tangible benefit: the voice 
and influence of people with different backgrounds and perspectives. 
Justice Marshall best stated this inclusive conception of the community 
in his plurality opinion in Peters v. Kiff181: 
[W]e are unwilling to make the assumption that the exclusion of 
Negroes has relevance only for issues involving race. When any 
large and identifiable segment of the community is excluded 
from jury service, the effect is to remove from the jury room 
qualities of human nature and varieties of human experience, the 
range of which is unknown and perhaps unknowable. It is not 
necessary to assume that the excluded group will consistently 
vote as a class in order to conclude, as we do, that its exclusion 
deprives the jury of a perspective on human events that may 
have unsuspected importance in any case that may be 
presented.182 
                                                     
180. See Pamela S. Karlan, Race, Rights, and Remedies in Criminal Adjudication, 96 MICH. L. 
REV. 2001, 2016 
(1998) (“[T]he Court has suggested that race and sex matter [for fair-cross section purposes] both 
because they might influence individual jurors’ perspectives and because the behavior of a jury as a 
whole might be affected by its racial and sexual composition. On the other hand, the Court has been 
equally insistent that stereotypical assumptions about jurors’ attitudes are both unjustified and 
unjustifiable.”).  
181. 407 U.S. 493 (1972). 
182. Id. at 503–04; cf. Ballard v. United States, 329 U. S. 187, 193–94 (1946) (“The truth is that 
the two sexes are not fungible; a community made up exclusively of one is different from a 
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While the Court accepts that the exclusion of an entire race from jury 
participation “deprives the jury of a perspective on human events that 
may have unsuspected importance in any case that may be presented,” 
individual Justices are sharply divided at the single juror (or single jury) 
level. In Powers v. Ohio,183 Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, 
emphasized that “[r]ace cannot be a proxy for determining juror bias or 
competence.”184 He continued: “A person’s race simply is unrelated to 
his fitness as a juror. We may not accept as a defense to racial 
discrimination the very stereotype the law condemns.”185 Similarly, in 
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.,186 Justice Kennedy’s opinion for 
the Court explained: 
[While] [i]t may be true that the role of litigants in determining 
the jury’s composition provides one reason for wide acceptance 
of the jury system and of its verdicts[,] if race stereotypes are the 
price for acceptance of a jury panel as fair, the price is too high 
to meet the standard of the Constitution.187 
The Court’s conservative wing, along with Justice Sotomayor, 
appears to hold the opposite view.188 Justice Sotomayor famously stated 
that her Latina heritage could not help but color her judgment on the 
bench because of the experiential diversity and shared customs it 
provides her.189 This connection between racial background and 
                                                     
community composed of both; the subtle interplay of influence one on the other is among the 
imponderables. To insulate the courtroom from either may not in a given case make an iota of 
difference. Yet a flavor, a distinct quality is lost if either sex is excluded.”). 
183. 499 U.S. 400 (1991). 
184. Id. at 410. 
185. Id. (internal citations omitted).  
186. 500 U.S. 614 (1991). 
187. Id. at 630. 
188. Of course, these positions are not inherently irreconcilable. One could support the ban on 
race-based peremptory challenges, believing that allowing parties to strike based on stereotypes is 
not worth the expense, and yet recognize that a black juror and a white juror are not fungible.  
189. Much of the controversy surrounding the confirmation of Justice Sotomayor focused on the 
following portion of a speech she gave while a judge on the Second Circuit:  
I would hope that a wise Latina woman with the richness of her experiences would more often 
than not reach a better conclusion than a white male who hasn’t lived that life. . . . Hence, one 
must accept the proposition that a difference there will be by the presence of women and 
people of color on the bench. Personal experiences affect the facts that judges choose to see. 
My hope is that I will take the good from my experiences and extrapolate them further into 
areas with which I am unfamiliar. I simply do not know exactly what that difference will be in 
my judging. But I accept there will be some based on my gender and my Latina heritage.  
Sonia Sotomayor, A Latina Judge’s Voice, 13 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 87, 92 (2002). Though 
Justice Sotomayor’s comments sparked great controversy, the intellectual heritage of her remarks 
can be traced back at least until Reconstruction. See Forman, supra note 93, at 898 (“Reconstruction 
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decision-making has been a popular theme of the Court’s conservative 
Justices in jury cases. For example, dissenting in Georgia v. 
McCollum,190 Justice Thomas acknowledged that juror race matters for 
verdict outcomes: “[S]ecuring representation of the defendant’s race on 
the jury may help to overcome racial bias and provide the defendant with 
a better chance of having a fair trial.”191 Justice Scalia’s dissent in 
Powers similarly notes the “undeniable reality . . . that all groups tend to 
have particular sympathies and hostilities—most notably, sympathies 
toward their own group members.”192 Justice O’Connor, concurring in 
J.E.B. v. Alabama,193 wrote:  
We know that like race, gender matters. . . . [O]ur holding is that 
any correlation between a juror’s gender and attitudes is 
irrelevant as a matter of constitutional law. But to say that gender 
makes no difference as a matter of law is not to say that gender 
makes no difference as a matter of fact.194 
The observations of United States Supreme Court Justices, wise as 
they may be, are not the sole source for determining whether jury race 
matters. In the remainder of this Part, we detail a variety of findings that 
corroborate the notion that race and ethnicity influence juror judgment. 
B. Practical Evidence from Federal Death Penalty Authorization 
Data Suggests that Juror Race Does Matter 
We discussed above how the decision to prosecute capital crimes 
federally results in less diverse jury pools. But do federal juries return 
death sentences in areas where larger minority group populations exist 
even at the federal district level? The three federal districts with the 
lowest death sentence-to-authorizations ratio are the District of 
                                                     
Republicans’ case for racially diverse juries was grounded in the understanding that people’s life 
experiences were significantly influenced by their race, and that these experiences, in turn, often 
made a difference in how they performed as jurors. So while the current majority believes that 
eliminating jury discrimination must be predicated on the belief that race is irrelevant, 
Reconstruction Republicans fought to end jury discrimination because of their contrary belief that 
race is significant.”). 
190. 502 U.S. 42 (1992). 
191. Id. at 61 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
192. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 424 (1991). 
193. 511 U.S. 127 (1994). 
194. Id. at 148–49 (O’Connor, J., concurring). But see id. at 153–54 (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(“[I]t is important to recognize that a juror sits not as a representative of a racial or sexual group but 
as an individual citizen. Nothing would be more pernicious to the jury system than for society to 
presume that persons of different backgrounds go to the jury room to voice prejudice.”). 
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Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Southern District of New York.195 These 
three federal districts account for 55 of the 460 death-authorized cases 
but are not responsible for a single death sentence.196 Each of these three 
federal districts has a relatively small white, non-Hispanic population: 
1.2% for Puerto Rico,197 32.5% for the District of Columbia,198 and 
46.7% for the Southern District of New York.199 
Federal death sentences also occur infrequently in areas where the 
county of offense and the federal district have similar demographic 
profiles. Excluding the three districts that have large minority 
populations (District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Southern District of 
New York), ten federal districts have had five or more death-
authorizations but have obtained zero death sentences.200 Eight of these 
districts have similar demographic profiles between the federal district 
and most populous county201: 
                                                     
195. See Appendix 1, supra note 16, at 38E, 63E, 57E. The Eastern District of Michigan has the 
same death sentence-to-authorization rate as the Southern District of New York, see id. at 48E, but 
the Eastern District of Michigan is 74% white and 18% black. See FedStats.gov, Demographic and 
Economic Profile, Federal Judicial District: Michigan Eastern, http://www.fedstats.gov/ 
mapstats/demographic/fjd/40.html (last visited June 13, 2010) (calculating percentages based on 
2005–2006 population figures). Wayne County, which encompasses Detroit, is 55% white and 42% 
black. See FedStats.gov, Wayne County, Michigan, http://www.fedstats.gov/qf/states/26/26163.html 
(last visited June 13, 2010). Of the sixteen death-authorizations in the Eastern District of Michigan, 
two resulted in acquittal, four are pending trial, two were withdrawn by the Government, one was 
dismissed, one never went to trial due to the death of the defendant, five resulted in guilty pleas, and 
one resulted in a life sentence from a jury. See Appendix 2, supra note 26, at 192E–207E. One 
possible causal explanation is that Michigan does not have the death penalty (and never has). See 
Death Penalty Information Center, States Without the Death Penalty, http:// 
www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty (last visited July 4, 2010). Of course, 
this explanation confounds race as an independent explanatory factor as the District of Columbia, 
Puerto Rico, and New York are all without the death penalty. See id; see also United States v. Fell, 
571 F.3d 264, 289 (2d Cir. 2009) (Calabresi, J., dissenting) (citing Alan Feuer, An Aversion to the 
Death Penalty, but No Shortage of Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2008, at B1 (“The very asking of 
the death penalty had long been unusual for federal prosecutors in much of our Circuit. And even 
when they have asked for it, juries—constitutionally mandated juries of the state and district—have 
refused to impose it. In other words, as a matter of judgment, applying the norms of their ‘state and 
district,’ local federal juries have repeatedly and overwhelmingly rejected Washington’s invitation 
to execute criminals in their states.”)).  
196. See Appendix 2, supra note 26. 
197. U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Data for Puerto Rico, http://www.census.gov/census2000/ 
states/pr.html (last visited Jun. 16, 2010). 
198. U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Data for the District of Columbia, http://www.census.gov/ 
census2000/states/dc.html (last visited Jun. 16, 2010). 
199. FedStats.gov, Demographic and Economic Profile, Federal Judicial District: New York 
Southern, http://www.fedstats.gov/mapstats/demographic/fjd/55.html (last visited June 13, 2010) 
(calculating percentages based on 2005–2006 population figures). 
200. See Appendix 1, supra note 16. 
201. See id.  
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Federal 
Jurisdiction 
Number of 
Death 
Authorizations/ 
Sentences202 
Percentage 
Whites/Blacks: 
District203 
Percentage 
Whites/Blacks: 
Populous 
County(ies) 204 
Eastern District 
of California 6/0 80/6 70/10 
Northern District 
of California 8/0 69/6 58/7 
District of  
Colorado 
6/0 89/1 83/10 
District of  
Connecticut 
5/0 85/10 
83/11 
81/14 
District of  
Kansas 
7/0 89/6 
82/9 
85/9 
District of 
New Mexico 
8/0 84/3 
92/1 
86/4 
Northern District 
of New York 5/0 91/5 
82/12 
85/10 
Middle District of 
Pennsylvania 
7/0 93/4 93/3 
 
                                                     
202. See id.  
203. The population percentages for the listed federal districts are calculated based on 2005–2006 
population figures from the “Federal Judicial Districts” database on FedStats.gov. See 
http://www.fedstats.gov/mapstats/fjd/ (last visited July 3, 2010). Data for an individual district can 
be accessed by selecting a state from the drop down list and selecting the individual district. 
204. The population percentages for individual counties are from the “MapStats: United States” 
database on FedStats.gov. See http://fedstats.gov/qf/ (last visited July 3, 2010). Data for an 
individual county can be accessed by selecting a state from the drop down list and then selecting the 
individual county from the drop down list on the next page. The most populous county or counties 
for the listed districts are as follows: Eastern District of California (Sacramento County), Northern 
District of California (San Francisco County), District of Colorado (Denver County), District of 
Connecticut (Fairfield County and Hartford County), District of Kansas (Sedgwick County and 
Shawnee County), District of New Mexico (Santa Fe County and Bernalillo County), Northern 
District of New York (Albany County and Onondaga County), and Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(Cumberland County). See id.  
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These statistics illustrate that the degree of demographic similarity 
between an overall federal district and its counties has an observable 
impact on death sentencing rates.205 
C. Attorneys Know that Juror Race Does Matter 
The Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause prohibits attorneys from 
striking jurors on the basis of their race.206 But that does not stop 
prosecutors from striking black jurors in criminal cases.207 In Snyder v. 
Louisiana,208 Justice Alito wrote the opinion for seven members of the 
Court reversing a death sentence out of Jefferson Parish, Louisiana, 
where the prosecution struck all five prospective black jurors.209 The 
                                                     
205. At first glance, the Southern District of Illinois (six authorizations, zero death sentences) 
appears to be an exception to the trend we document. See Appendix 1, supra note 16, at 44C, 44D. 
The Southern District is 88% white and 10% black. See FedStats.gov, Demographic and Economic 
Profile, Federal Judicial District: Illinois Southern, http://www.fedstats.gov/mapstats/ 
demographic/fjd/26.html (last visited June 13, 2010) (calculating percentages based on 2005–2006 
population figures). Saint Clair County, which encompasses East Saint Louis, is 67% white and 
29% black. FedStats.gov, St. Clair County, Illinois, http://www.fedstats.gov/qf/states/17/17163.html 
(last visited June 13, 2010). However, no jury in the Southern District ever has decided a capital 
case. Out of the six authorizations, five authorizations were withdrawn before trial. The final 
defendant pleaded guilty. Appendix 2, supra note 26. Both the Western District of Tennessee (nine 
authorizations, zero death sentences) and Shelby County, which encompasses Memphis, have 
(relatively) high black citizen populations at 38% and 52% respectively. See Appendix 1, supra note 
16, at 65C and 65D; see also FedStats.gov, Demographic and Economic Profile, Federal Judicial 
District: Tennessee Western, http://www.fedstats.gov/mapstats/demographic/fjd/75.html (last 
visited June 13, 2010) (calculating percentages based on 2005–2006 population figures); 
FedStats.gov, Shelby County, Tennessee, http://www.fedstats.gov/qf/states/47/47157.html (last 
visited June 13, 2010). The Middle District of Tennessee (five authorizations, zero death sentences) 
is closer to being an exception to the trend. See Appendix 1, supra note 16, at 64C and 64D. The 
Middle District is 82% white and 13% black. See FedStats.gov, Demographic and Economic 
Profile, Federal Judicial District: Tennessee Middle, http://www.fedstats.gov/mapstats/ 
demographic/fjd/74.html (June 13, 2010) (calculating percentages based on 2005–2006 population 
figures). Davidson County, which encompasses Nashville, is 67% white and 27% black. 
FedStats.gov, Davidson County, Tennessee, http://www.fedstats.gov/qf/states/47/47037.html (last 
visited June 13, 2010).  
206. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (“[T]he Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor 
to challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race or on the assumption that black jurors as 
a group will be unable impartially to consider the State’s case against a black defendant.”). 
207. In federal capital prosecutions where the shift in the jury pool dilutes minority 
representation, Batson violations compound the problem. For example, in a case involving a black 
defendant sentenced to death out of Orleans Parish, prosecutors used eight strikes to remove all but 
two black jurors. Memorandum of Law and Points of Authority in Support of Movant’s Motion for 
New Trial at 6, United States v. Johnson, 2010 WL 1294058 (E.D. La. Mar. 29, 2010) (No. 04-CR-
00017), 2009 WL 2968118 at ¶ 12. 
208. 552 U.S. 472 (2008). 
209. Id. at 474–76. “Although African Americans made up approximately 20% of the population 
of Jefferson Parish in 1996, nine—10.6%—of the eighty-five prospective jurors questioned in the 
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trial judge asked the prosecutor to proffer a race-neutral explanation for 
striking one of the black jurors,210 Mr. Brooks. The prosecutor explained 
that Brooks looked “nervous” about missing his time as a student teacher 
(even though the judge received assurance from Brooks’ dean that his 
absence would be excused).211 By contrast, the State did not strike a 
white juror, Mr. Laws, who was “a self-employed general contractor,” 
with “two houses that are nearing completion.”212 One of the houses had 
occupants “moving in [that] weekend,” and Mr. Laws explained that if 
he served on the jury then “the people won’t [be able to] move in.”213 
Moreover, Mr. Laws stated “[m]y wife just had a hysterectomy, so I’m 
running the kids back and forth to school, and we’re not originally from 
here, so I have no family in the area, so between the two things, it’s kind 
of bad timing for me.”214 
The strike-pattern in the Snyder case is not an aberration in Jefferson 
Parish (a heavily white parish adjacent to Orleans Parish, Louisiana). 
The Louisiana Supreme Court has addressed three convictions in the last 
decade where Jefferson Parish prosecutors appeared to exclude jurors on 
the basis of race.215 Jefferson Parish prosecutors are particularly adept at 
keeping blacks off of Jefferson Parish capital juries: prosecutors 
successfully struck forty-two of forty-nine (90%) qualified black jurors 
(and attempted to strike two more) in twelve capital prosecutions.216 
These strike rates left zero black jurors on seven death cases, one black 
                                                     
six panels were black. Four were dismissed for cause. The prosecution used peremptory strikes to 
remove the remaining five.” Brief for the Petitioner at 10, Snyder, 552 U.S. 472 (No. 06-10119) 
(internal citations omitted). 
210. There are three steps to the Batson inquiry: “First, a defendant must make a prima facie 
showing that a peremptory challenge has been exercised on the basis of race; second, if that 
showing has been made, the prosecution must offer a race-neutral basis for striking the juror in 
question; and third, in light of the parties’ submissions, the trial court must determine whether the 
defendant has shown purposeful discrimination.” Snyder, 552 U.S. at 476–77 (internal citations 
omitted).  
211. Id. at 478, 480–81. 
212. Id. at 483. 
213. Id. at 483–84. 
214. Id. at 484. 
215. State v. Harris, 820 So. 2d 471, 472, 474 (La. 2002) (reversed on Batson grounds where 
prosecutor gave the following race-neutral reason for striking a black juror: he is “a single black 
male on the panel with no children”); State v. Jacobs, 789 So. 2d 1280, 1283 n.2 (La. 2001) (noting 
that judge failed to “properly address Batson challenges” where prosecutor appeared to strike jurors 
for racially discriminatory purposes); State v. Myers, 761 So. 2d 498, 499–500, 503 (La. 2000) 
(reversing where trial court neglected Batson analysis despite the State striking six of seven black 
venire members). 
216. Brief of Ministers, supra note 100, at 9–10. 
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juror on four death cases, and two black jurors on one death case.217 
These numbers are only slightly better in non-capital cases. A study of 
390 trials and 10,000 prospective jurors in Jefferson Parish from 1994 to 
2002 reveals that prosecutors struck 55% of qualified black jurors but 
only 16% of qualified white jurors.218 
The Jefferson Parish experience is not unique. In Miller-El v. 
Dretke,219 the Court reversed a capital conviction where prosecutors 
used their peremptory challenges to strike ten of eleven prospective 
black jurors.220 The Court noted that the Dallas, Texas prosecutor’s 
office had a long-standing history of striking as many black jurors as 
possible, used a twenty year-old voir dire manual that instructed line 
prosecutors to exclude prospective black jurors, took advantage of a 
“jury shuffle” process to dilute the concentration of blacks on jury 
panels, and used different lines of scripted questioning for black and 
white jurors.221 The Court also noted testimony from a district court 
judge, who was formerly a prosecutor at the Dallas District Attorney’s 
office, that allowing a black person to serve on a jury constituted a 
terminable offense at the office during the 1950s and 1960s.222 In 
Pennsylvania, a study of 317 Philadelphia capital trials revealed that 
prosecutors struck 51% of black jurors but 26% of non-black jurors.223 
Blacks are not struck because they are black, but rather because of the 
perceptions that black Americans have an appreciation for the complex 
circumstances that lead a criminal defendant—especially a black 
criminal defendant—to commit an offense.224 Prosecutors also believe 
that black jurors tend to be more mistrusting of law enforcement than 
                                                     
217. Id. at 11.  
218. Id. at 11 (citing Richard Bourke, Joe Hingston & Joel Devine, Black Strikes: A Study of the 
Racially Disparate Use of Peremptory Challenges By the Jefferson Parish District Attorney’s Office 
(Sep. 2003), available at http://blackstrikes.com/resources/report/black_strikes_report_september_ 
2003.pdf. 
219. 545 U.S. 231 (2005). 
220. Id. at 237, 265. 
221. Id. at 253–55, 264 (noting the “widely known evidence of the general policy of the Dallas 
County District Attorney’s Office to exclude black venire members from juries”).  
222. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 334 (2003). 
223. See Dretke, 545 U.S. at 268 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing David C. Baldus et al., The Use 
of Peremptory Challenges in Capital Murder Trials: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 3 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 3, 52–53, 73 n.197 (2001)). 
224. See, e.g., Samuel R. Sommers & Michael I. Norton, Race and Jury Selection: A 
Psychological Perspective on the Peremptory Challenge Debate, 63 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 527, 531 
(2008) (“A provocative issue in considering juror stereotypes is that some of these assumptions 
about race may be accurate. Research suggests, for instance, that Black jurors are often more lenient 
toward Black defendants than are White jurors.”). 
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white jurors.225 Whether or not these stereotypes are accurate, the larger 
point is that juror race (or at least race by proxy) matters. Otherwise 
Batson’s command that jurors not be struck on account of race would be 
far easier to enforce.226 
D. Experimental Evidence Suggests that Both Jury Composition and 
Juror Race Mediate Verdict Outcomes 
Dissenting in Georgia v. McCollum,227 Justice O’Connor underscored 
the “substantial reason to believe that the distorting influence of race is 
minimized on a racially mixed jury.”228 Minority group juror dilution 
can impact the outcomes of capital cases.229 Majority group jurors 
exhibit greater implicit (if not explicit) bias against black defendants.230 
Further, as this section discusses, majority group jurors also interpret 
ambiguous evidence in racially-biased ways, utilize stereotypes to 
prejudge black defendants, are susceptible to ubiquitous priming devices 
that shape outcomes in racially influenced directions, and may treat 
black defendants more harshly than white defendants. 
Social science research using mock jury studies, as well as juror 
interviews from real capital jurors, lend empirical support to the claim 
by suggesting that diverse juries deliberate more thoroughly, discuss a 
broader range of evidence, perceive evidence more accurately, and 
perceive themselves as more legitimate than all-white juries.231 
                                                     
225. Id. 
226. See Dretke, 545 U.S. at 270 (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting that, despite Batson, “the use of 
race- and gender-based stereotypes in the jury-selection process seems better organized and more 
systematized than ever before”).  
227. 505 U.S. 42 (1992). 
228. Id. at 68 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
229. For a broader examination of how federal prosecutions impact the jury pool in non-capital 
cases, see Laura G. Dooley, The Dilution Effect: Federalization, Fair Cross-Sections, and the 
Concept of Community, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 79, 80 (2004) (“But a new, subtler manipulation of the 
jury composition scheme is emerging, one that makes the theoretical issues around the concept of 
community immediate and compelling. Federal prosecutors are taking control in increasing numbers 
of criminal prosecutions previously within the purview of state prosecutors. This ‘federalization’ of 
so-called street crime, notably murders and robberies, has the effect in most states of widening the 
‘community’ from which jurors will be drawn from a county within a state to a federal district or 
division encompassing several counties. A troubling second-order effect of this practice, then, is to 
de-localize juries, often diluting any significant minority representation.”).  
230. See Janet Bond Arterton, Unconscious Bias and the Impartial Jury, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1023, 
1025–29 (2008); Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking, and 
Misremembering, 57 DUKE L. J. 345, 350–73 (2007).  
231. See Samuel R. Sommers, On Racial Diversity and Group Decision Making: Identifying 
Multiple Effects of Racial Composition on Jury Deliberations, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 597 (2006). In 2006, Professor Sommers conducted a mock jury experiment aimed at 
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Community members also view verdicts from diverse juries as more 
legitimate.232 Jury diversity also impacts verdict outcomes. The notion 
that black jurors return guilty verdicts less frequently than white jurors is 
no longer surprising. But experimental evidence suggests that white 
jurors who serve on diverse juries return guilty verdicts less frequently 
than white jurors serving on all-white juries.233 The experimental data 
converges with other findings on the effects of racial diversity on jury 
outcomes. Professor William Bowers studied seventy-four capital jury 
trials with a black defendant and a white victim, and found that juries 
with four or more white jurors have a much higher death sentencing rate 
than juries with two or more black jurors.234 Simply adding a single 
black person altered the deliberation outcomes. Juries with no black 
members imposed death sentences in 71.9% of cases.235 When at least 
one black person served on the jury the number plummeted to 42.9%.236 
                                                     
measuring the impact of juror diversity on jury deliberations and outcomes. Sommers used 200 jury-
eligible participants, who, with the help of local judges and jury-pool administrators, were recruited 
largely at a Michigan courthouse where the jurors had arrived for jury service. Id. at 602. Sommers 
first divided participants into two types of juries: homogonous juries (six white jurors) and 
heterogeneous juries (four white jurors and two black jurors). Id. at 600. He then provided each jury 
with either a race-neutral or race-salient voir dire questionnaire. Next, he showed each jury a 30-
minute Court TV video trial summary of a black defendant in a sexual assault case. Each jury then 
heard an experimenter read Michigan jury instructions and remind the jurors that their objective was 
to reach unanimity. Finally, Sommers asked each jury to deliberate for sixty minutes. Id. at 602–03. 
Heterogeneous juries performed better across every measure of thoroughness and accuracy. Juries 
with four white and two black jurors deliberated longer (50.67 minutes versus 38.49 minutes), 
discussed more case facts (30.48 versus 25.93), made fewer factually inaccurate statements (4.14 
versus 7.28), had fewer factual inaccuracies left uncorrected (1.36 versus 2.49), cited more 
“missing” evidence (1.87 versus 1.07), raised more race-related issues (3.79 versus 2.07), discussed 
possible racism more freely (1.35 versus .93), and displayed less resistance at the very mention of 
racism (22% of comments met with resistance versus 100%) than all-white juries. Id. at 605. While 
black jurors raised race-related issues (e.g. the role of race in police investigations) most often, 
white jurors on diverse juries raised these issues much more frequently than white jurors on all-
white juries. Interestingly, white jurors serving on diverse juries raised the possibility of racism 
more than their fellow black jurors and more than white jurors on all-white juries. Id. at 605–06. 
232. See Leslie Ellis & Shari Seidman Diamond, Race, Diversity, and Jury Composition: 
Battering and Bolstering Legitimacy, 78 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 1033, 1039 (2003). 
233. See Sommers, supra note 231, at 606. 
234. William J. Bowers et al., Crossing Racial Boundaries: A Closer Look At The Roots of Racial 
Bias in Capital Sentencing When the Defendant Is Black and the Victim Is White, 53 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 1497, 1501 (2004). 
235. Id. 
236. Id.; see also Adam Liptak, Court Ruling Expected to Spur Convictions in Capital Cases, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2007, at A1, A12 (reporting that in one study published in the University of 
Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law where over 1,155 capital jurors were interviewed, 
researchers found that “the presence of a single Black male juror . . . reduc[ed] the likelihood of a 
death sentence to 43 percent from 72 percent”). These findings converge with the more general 
understanding that decision-maker diversity increases the likelihood that outcomes are not 
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Implicit social cognition might account for why juror race (and thus 
jury composition) mediates the quality and outcome of jury 
deliberations.237 Implicit social cognition refers to the process by which 
the brain uses “mental associations that are so well-established as to 
operate without awareness, or without intention, or without control.”238 
Thousands of American citizens participate each year in studies 
designed to measure implicit associations.239 Results consistently 
demonstrate that white participants (and, to a lesser degree, participants 
from a variety of other racial and ethnic backgrounds) have strong 
implicit associations between “White and Good,” “Black and Bad,” and 
“Black and Guilty.”240 The results have predictive validity.241 High 
implicit bias scores correlate with disparate treatment of black 
defendants: jurors tend to interpret242 and misremember243 evidence in 
                                                     
influenced by race. See e.g., Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CAL. 
L. REV. 969, 981 (2006) (“A significant body of social science evidence supports the conclusion 
that the presence of population diversity in an environment tends to reduce the level of implicit 
bias.”); see generally Kim Taylor Thompson, Empty Votes in Jury Deliberations, 113 HARV. L. 
REV. 1261, 1276–95 (2000) (explaining the correlation between race, experience, and verdict 
outcomes). 
237. See Georgia v. McCollum, 502 U.S. 42, 69 (1992) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“In a world 
where the outcome of a minority defendant’s trial may turn on the misconceptions or biases of 
White jurors, there is cause to question the implications of this Court’s good intentions.”). 
238. Project Implicit, FAQS: “What is the Difference Between ‘Implicit’ and ‘Automatic’?,” 
https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/demo/background/faqs.html#faq5 (last visited June 13, 2010). 
239. See, e.g., Jerry Kang & Mahzarin Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of 
“Affirmative Action,” 94 CAL. L. REV. 1063, 1064 (2006) (“[E]vidence from hundreds of thousands 
of individuals across the globe shows that (1) the magnitude of implicit bias toward members of 
outgroups or disadvantaged groups is large, (2) implicit bias often conflicts with conscious attitudes, 
endorsed beliefs, and intentional behavior, [and] (3) implicit bias influences evaluations of and 
behavior toward those who are the subject of the bias . . . .”). 
240. See Justin D. Levinson, Huajian Cai & Danielle Young, Guilty by Implicit Racial Bias: The 
Guilty/Not Guilty Implicit Association Test, OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. (forthcoming), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1471567 (finding that participants have strong implicit associations 
between “Black” and “Guilty,” and that these results have strong predictive validity). 
241. But see Ralph Richard Banks & Richard Thompson Ford, (How) Does Unconscious Bias 
Matter?: Law, Politics, and Racial Inequality, 58 EMORY L.J. 1053, 1068 (2009) (noting that the 
implicit association test could be measuring conscious racism that the beholder would rather the 
public not know rather than unconsciously held beliefs: “The great contribution of the [implicit 
association test] may be not that it captures a new type of bias, so much as that it employs a subtle 
and sophisticated means of measuring bias, which has become ever more elusive as research 
participants attempt to outsmart any test that would label them a racist.”). 
242. See Justin Levinson & Danielle Young, Compelling (Skin Tone) Evidence: Implicit Racial 
Bias and Judgments of Ambiguous Evidence, 112 W. VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1601615. Professor Levinson tested whether implicit race bias impacts 
jurors’ interpretation of ambiguous evidence. Levinson provided a group of jury-eligible 
participants with a brief background story of a fictional Mini-Mart robbery and then had the 
participants view three pictures from the crime scene for four seconds each. The first and second 
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racially biased ways, correlate black physical features with 
criminality,244 provide less “mental due process” to black defendants,245 
and judge black defendants more harshly.246 
                                                     
pictures were innocuous. The third picture—the centerpiece of the study—displayed one masked 
assailant reaching over the counter with a gun in his left hand. The only identifiable race-cue for the 
assailant is a small section of visible flesh on his forearm. Levinson altered the skin-tone of the 
assailant, showing half the participants a light-skinned suspect and the other half a dark-skinned 
suspect. After watching the short video, suspects were told that a suspect was caught, and then 
provided with a series of ambiguous evidence about the suspect. Levinson asked the participants to 
rate the probative value of each piece of ambiguous evidence. The study produced several results. 
First, participants shown the photo with the dark-skinned suspect were significantly more likely to 
find ambiguous evidence more probative of guilt. Participants who viewed the dark-skinned 
defendant were also more likely to believe that the suspect was guilty—both on a scale of 0 to 100 
and by a traditional guilty / not guilty measure. As Levinson concluded, these results undermine the 
foundational assumption that guilt is weighed solely based on the probative strength of the evidence. 
Id. 
243. See Levinson, supra note 230. Professor Levinson conducted an experiment to test whether 
implicit race bias impacted jurors’ memories of case facts. Levinson provided jury-eligible 
participants with a fictional story about a confrontation between two men. Some jurors read about 
“William” the white defendant, while others read about “Tyronne” the black defendant. Id. at 350. 
The rest of the story remained constant. But when Levinson asked jurors to remember pertinent 
facts from “the confrontation,” he found that the race of the defendant affected how participants 
recalled the story’s details. Participants more frequently remembered aggressive details when 
Tyronne rather than William was the defendant. Id. Levinson concluded “that the race of a civil 
plaintiff or a criminal defendant can act implicitly to cause people to misremember a case’s facts in 
racially biased ways.” Id. The participants appeared to remember “facts” that did not appear in the 
story more often when those facts were stereotype-consistent, such as facts that portray black males 
as aggressive. See id. at 398–401. 
244. See Jennifer Eberhardt et al., Looking Deathworthy: Perceived Stereotypicality of Black 
Defendants Predicts Capital-Sentencing Outcomes, 17 PYSCHOL. SCI. 383 (2006). Equipped with a 
dataset of 600 death-eligible defendants in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania between 1979–99 (the Baldus 
dataset), Professor Jennifer Eberhardt set out to determine whether a black defendant’s physical 
features (and, more specifically, his stereotypical “Blackness”) impacted juror views of the 
defendant’s death-worthiness. Id. at 383–84. Eberhardt took the pictures of the 44 black defendants 
(from the Baldus dataset) who had been convicted of killing white victims and whose trials 
proceeded to the penalty phase. She then asked participants (who were not told that the men in the 
pictures were criminals) to rate each picture in terms of stereotypical blackness. Id. at 384. She then 
took the ratings of the 44 defendants, determined whether each had been sentenced to death, 
controlled for six non-racial factors known to impact capital sentencing, and then calculated 
whether the presence of stereotypical black physical features impacted death verdict outcomes. Id. 
The results in cases with a white victim and black defendant, not only is the fact of being black 
influential, but the degree to which black defendants appear stereotypically black (e.g., thick lips, 
wide nose) correlates with the likelihood of being sentenced to death. Black defendants whose 
appearance situated them among the top half of the stereotypicality distribution were more than 
twice as likely to receive a death sentence. Id. 
       Eberhardt also investigated the relationship between the use of non-human terminology to 
describe black capital defendants and sentencing outcomes. See Phillip Atiba Goff, Jennifer L. 
Eberhardt, Melissa J. Williams & Matthew Christian Jackson, Not Yet Human: Implicit Knowledge, 
Historical Dehumanization, and Contemporary Consequences, 94 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 292 (2008). In earlier laboratory research, Eberhardt had determined that after being 
flashed a picture of a black face, participants are able to recognize pictures of apes in fewer frames 
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The social science research confirms what the architects of the 
Constitution appeared to understand: a jury of one’s neighbors and peers 
is better at ferreting out the complex nuances in events—complexities 
that are specifically relevant in a jury’s determination whether to 
sentence a defendant to life or death. Still the question remains: how do 
the courts administer this understanding? 
                                                     
than immediately after being flashed a picture of a white face. Id. at 296. Participants were also able 
to pair the words “ape” and “black” together more rapidly than other combinations such as “ape” 
and “feline.” Id. at 301. When primed with a picture of an ape, participants were more likely to find 
that a black suspect being beaten by the police deserved the beating than when participants were 
primed with a picture of a big cat. Id. at 302. Moving from the lab to real capital cases, Eberhardt 
found that even after controlling for well-known factors that affect death-sentencing, news stories 
about black capital defendants made more ape-like references than news stories about white capital 
defendants, and that the number of times news articles made these ape-like references correlates 
with the rate at which black defendants are sentenced to death. Id. at 304.  
245. See Matthew D. Lieberman et al., An fMRI Investigation of Race-Related Amygdala Activity 
in African-American and Caucasian-American Individuals, 8 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 720 (2005). 
Professor Matthew Lieberman and colleagues conducted an experiment using functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) technology to measure the level of amygdala activity of participants after 
seeing a black versus a white face. Id. at 720. The amygdala is a region of the brain that mediates 
emotional responses, including perceived threats. Id. Lieberman found that amygdala activity in 
both white and black participants increased when shown a black face versus a white face. Id. at 721. 
The authors concluded that the most plausible explanation for this universal increase in amygdala 
activity is likely due to the activation of “culturally learned negative associations regarding African-
Americans.” Id. at 722. These negative associations appear to play out in practice. Professor Joshua 
Correll created a video game that depicted a picture of either a white or a black suspect, and then 
coupled that suspect with either a gun or an innocuous object (i.e. a wallet). Joshua Correll, Event-
Related Potentials and the Decision to Shoot: The Role of Threat Perception and Cognitive Control, 
42 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 120, 120 (2006). Study participants were asked to play the 
video game by looking at the suspects as they appeared on the screen and then to determine whether 
or not to shoot. Id. The results displayed a bias against black suspects among participants: 
“participants shot armed Blacks more quickly than armed whites, and decided not to shoot unarmed 
Whites more quickly than unarmed Blacks.” Id. at 126. 
246. See, e.g., Jack Glaser, Karin Martin & Kimberly Kahn, Possibility of Death Sentence Has 
Divergent Effect on Verdicts for Black and White Defendants (Dec. 4, 2009) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1428943. Professor Jack Glaser utilized a random 
sample of jury eligible citizens spread across the United States to test whether defendant race 
mediated guilty and not guilty outcomes in cases with the possibility of a death sentence. Id. at 2. 
Glaser had the participants read materials from a fictional triple murder case (including crime 
description, closing arguments and witness testimony). Id. at 3. Though the participants read the 
same case summary, half the participants were told that death was the maximum punishment 
possible while the other half of the participants were told that life without the possibility of parole 
was the maximum. Id. Half the “defendants” were black, half white. Id. The participants who were 
told that death was the maximum possible punishment convicted black defendants at a higher rate 
than white defendants—80.4% versus 56.5%. Id. at 5. In contrast, in cases where a life sentence was 
the maximum possible punishment, participants convicted blacks and whites at nearly equal rates—
67.7% versus 66.7%. Id. at 1. Because defendant race impacts verdict outcome more severely in 
cases where death is a possible sentence, Professor Glaser concludes that “capital punishment may 
be more than another domain of racial disparities; it may actually be a cause.” Id. at 6. 
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V. WHAT COMMUNITY—WHO IS MY NEIGHBOR? 
“Community members are best positioned to decide how passive or 
aggressive they want their cops to be because they are the ones who 
must live with—and who may die from—the consequences of their 
choice. Our Founders understood this basic idea; why don’t we?” 
 
— Akhil Amar247 
 
Two co-existing principles govern our assessment of the federal death 
penalty. First, the expansion of the venire in federal death penalty cases 
creates a demographic shift in the racial make up of the venire. Second, 
the expansion of the venire beyond the county of the offense detaches 
the local community from the decision making in federal death 
sentences. This Part traces the broadening overlap of these two 
principles. 
Determining the relevant geographic boundaries for superimposing 
community values onto a determination that a particular individual 
should receive the death penalty depends on the content of the relevant 
values and how those values shift as geographic regions expand. The 
jury’s function is key to determining which citizens constitute the proper 
community. The United States Supreme Court has made clear that the 
determination of whether a defendant lives or dies must be the moral 
judgment of the community—not a decision left solely to a legislature to 
determine which offenses require mandatory imposition of the death 
penalty.248 But defining who constitutes the “community” or who 
comprises a defendant’s “equals and neighbors” has been an elusive 
task. 
The expansion of the federal venire has relevance in the context of a 
variety of federal prosecutions.249 However, nowhere does the expansion 
of the federal venire have more of an impact than in the application of 
the federal death penalty. This is true, in the first instance, because the 
determination to impose the death penalty is an exclusively subjective 
moral determination, and second, because it is a subjective moral 
determination that is susceptible to the influence of race bias. The capital 
jury’s morality function mirrors the “fact and law” determinations that 
                                                     
247. Akhil Reed Amar, A Tale of Two Cities, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/ 
20000501_amar.html (last visited June 15, 2010).  
248. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976). 
249. Federal prosecutions for possession of firearms in Virginia, for instance, have received 
special scrutiny. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 36 F. Supp. 2d 304, 309–10 (E.D. Va. 1999).  
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English common law and United States’ Founding-era juries had to 
make.250 Thus, the locality or “familiarness” function that a jury of the 
vicinage serves is of greater relevance in capital cases today than in 
other federal criminal prosecutions. 
In capital cases, vicinage and the Eighth Amendment’s ability to track 
society’s evolving standards of decency are closely related. The content 
of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause depends upon the 
standards of decency in a modern society.251 Jury verdicts provide a 
necessary link between community values and interpretation of the 
Eighth Amendment.252 In death penalty cases, the consensus of the 
community is particularly important. In non-capital murder cases the 
jury must determine only whether enough evidence exists to determine 
that the defendant committed the crime. However, in capital cases, the 
sentencing jury is asked to weigh more amorphous considerations, 
including “the character and record of the individual offender and the 
circumstances of the particular offense. . . .”253 
In Turner v. Murray,254 the United States Supreme Court emphasized 
that a juror’s decision to vote to impose a death sentence is a “highly 
subjective, unique [and] individualized judgment regarding the 
punishment that a particular person deserves.”255 Because of the 
subjective nature of the determination and, more generally, the “the 
range of discretion entrusted to a jury in a capital sentencing hearing,” 
the Court underscored that the capital sentencing determination is “a 
unique opportunity for racial prejudice to operate but remain 
undetected.”256 The Court also noted that “subtle, less consciously held” 
                                                     
250. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 238 (2005) (“Alongside 
their right and power to acquit against the evidence, eighteenth-century jurors also claimed the right 
and power to consider legal as well as factual issues—to judge both law and fact ‘complicately’—
when rendering any general verdict.”). 
251. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).  
252. As we explain below, the relevant community should be defined (in part) by reference to the 
geographic area most impacted by the offense. In the case of murders, the county is closer to the 
center of impact (though not as close as the neighborhood) than the federal district. In the context of 
terrorist attacks against the United States, the nationwide impact of the crime might well counsel for 
a broader cross-section of the community. Cf. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 32–33 (1973) 
(explaining that the federal district is the relevant community for determining obscenity standards, 
but authorizing federal judges to refocus the inquiry (and thus the relevant community) beyond (or 
presumably to a subsection within) the district’s geographical expanse if necessary). 
253. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (quoting Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304).  
254. 476 U.S. 28 (1986). 
255. Id. at 33–34 (internal quotations omitted). 
256. Id. at 35; see also Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 555 (1979) (“Discrimination on the basis 
of race, odious in all aspects, is especially pernicious in the administration of justice.”). 
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beliefs could operate to skew the sentencing outcome in a racially 
discriminatory manner.257 
Though the Court acknowledges the “subjective” nature of the 
determination entrusted to the capital sentencing jury, it also interprets 
the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment to 
require a “special need for reliability in the determination that death is 
the appropriate punishment in any capital case.”258 This “reliability” is 
tricky business. Unlike the finding of whether the defendant did in fact 
pull the trigger and kill the bank teller, the question of whether the 
defendant deserves death is hopelessly moral and necessarily 
comparative and situational. For example, the relative heinousness of the 
crime depends upon the type of violence with which the jurors are 
familiar or have experienced. The relative culpability of the defendant 
(including acceptance of mitigating evidence such as being the victim of 
severe abuse) depends on how well the jurors empathize or can relate to 
the level of trauma experienced by the defendant and their belief that the 
trauma translates into lesser responsibility for undesirable actions. 
Given both the “subjective” nature of the capital sentencing 
determination and the need for “heightened reliability” in determining 
which defendants in the already narrow category of convicted first-
degree murderers deserve death, the federal death penalty relies upon the 
wisdom of twelve jurors to “express the conscience of the community on 
                                                     
257. Turner, 476 U.S. at 35–36. For a more detailed expression of these “subtle, less consciously 
held” beliefs, see Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 274 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (“Bias both conscious and unconscious, reflecting traditional and unexamined habits of 
thought, keeps up barriers that must come down if equal opportunity and nondiscrimination are ever 
genuinely to become the country’s law and practice.”). 
258. Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 584–85 (1988) (citing Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 
349, 363–64 (1977) (White, J., concurring) (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. at 280, 
305 (1976))) (internal quotation marks omitted); California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998–99 (1983) 
(stating the law “requires a correspondingly greater degree of scrutiny of the capital sentencing 
determination than of other criminal judgments”); see also Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604 (“We are 
satisfied that [the] qualitative difference between death and other penalties calls for a greater degree 
of reliability when the death sentence is imposed.”). The Lockett Court described the “qualitative 
difference” between the capital and non-capital sentencing as follows: 
The considerations that account for the wide acceptance of individualization of sentences in 
noncapital cases surely cannot be thought less important in capital cases. Given that the 
imposition of death by public authority is so profoundly different from all other penalties, we 
cannot avoid the conclusion that an individualized decision is essential in capital cases. The 
need for treating each defendant in a capital case with that degree of respect due the uniqueness 
of the individual is far more important than in noncapital cases. A variety of flexible 
techniques—probation, parole, work furloughs, to name a few—and various postconviction 
remedies may be available to modify an initial sentence of confinement in noncapital cases. 
The nonavailability of corrective or modifying mechanisms with respect to an executed capital 
sentence underscores the need for individualized consideration as a constitutional requirement 
in imposing the death sentence.  
Id. at 605. 
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the ultimate question of life or death.”259 So federal capital jurors of 
necessity should be from a narrower community, but how narrow?260 A 
voting rights analogy is apt. In terms of participation in the democratic 
process, the right to serve on a jury is comparable to the right to vote.261 
In the voting rights context, the Court has sanctioned electoral districting 
based on “communities of interest.”262 To determine where to draw the 
physical boundary lines around a “community,” the Court looks to 
several factors relevant to our analysis here: (1) respect for political 
subdivisions, (2) political affiliation, and (3) socioeconomic status.263 
A. Respect for Political Subdivisions 
Delimiting the county as the relevant community to adjudicate a 
federal capital case aligns with the notion that communities of interest 
should respect pre-existing political subdivisions. Today, states draw 
juries from counties or independent cities (e.g. St. Louis). And for good 
reason. The county is the largest intra-state body of government besides 
the state itself. But the federal district is a fictional community. There 
are no political ties that bind. The impact of the verdict is not dispersed 
throughout the federal district, but instead is disproportionately (or even 
solely) absorbed by the locality where the crime occurred. 
                                                     
259. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968). 
260. Local juries are best able to express the unique values of the community. See Engel, supra 
note 65, at 1696 (“The jury’s political role requires it to be representative of a particular community, 
for the “common sense” of one people may be quite different from that of another. Only by 
representing the diverse perspectives within the community can the jury voice the ‘common sense’ 
of the community as a whole.”). 
261. Interestingly, jury service appears to have a positive attitudinal and behavioral effect on 
civic participation, and even positively impacts likelihood to vote in subsequent elections. John 
Gastil et al., Jury Service and Electoral Participation: A Test of the Participation Hypothesis, 70 J. 
POL. 351 (2008); John Gastil et al., From Group Member to Democratic Citizen: How Deliberating 
with Fellow Jurors Reshapes Civic Attitudes, 34 HUM. COMM. RES. 137, 145 (2008) (“Positive 
changes in jurors’ civic identity and trust in fellow citizens and public institutions flow from . . . the 
deliberative quality of talk in the jury room and . . . overall satisfaction with the jury deliberation 
and verdict.”).  
262. Kim Forde-Mazrui, Jural Districting: Selecting Impartial Juries Through Community 
Representation, 52 VAND. L. REV. 353, 382–84 (1999).We do not argue here, as others have done, 
that the Court should allow jural redistricting. See generally id. We simply borrow the criterion the 
Court considers to draw lines around the concept of a community.  
263. Id. (“In identifying such communities, the Court permits the consideration of various 
demographic characteristics, including ‘traditional districting principles such as compactness, 
contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions,’ and other indicia of shared interest such as 
political affiliation, socioeconomic status, religion, or occupation.”) (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 509 
U.S. 630, 646 (1993)).  
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Drawing state and federal prosecution lines at the same boundaries 
removes the incentive for federal prosecutors to pursue a federal capital 
prosecution for the purpose of obtaining a racially skewed venire.264 The 
ability to obtain a death sentence does play a role whether to prosecute 
federally.265 The federal prosecution of John Johnson for a killing that 
occurred in Orleans Parish may be illustrative.266 For instance, the 
Government’s desire to prosecute Johnson in the Eastern District of 
Louisiana in order to obtain a death sentence may be apparent from its 
refusal to allow Johnson to plead guilty and avoid the death penalty267—
a privilege afforded to both the Unabomber and abortion-clinic bomber 
Eric Rudolph.268 But selective prosecution claims are notoriously 
                                                     
264. See Engel, supra note 65, at 1660 (“[T]he vicinage presumption provides a neutral venue 
rule that limits the government’s ability to select a forum inconvenient or hostile to the defendant.”). 
265. Cf. United States v. Jones, 36 F. Supp. 2d 304, 309–10 (E.D. Va. 1999) (“At a local Bench-
Bar Conference discussing the issue, an Assistant United States Attorney (‘AUSA’) stated that one 
goal of Project Exile [wherein the federal government prosecutes violent crimes involving firearms 
that would normally be prosecuted by the state] is to avoid ‘Richmond juries.’ The same admission 
was made by the AUSA prosecuting United States v. Scates . . . .”); see also id. at 316 (noting that 
where “local authorities claim to have the capacity to address the problem, the invited federal 
incursion raises serious motivational concerns.”). The fact that a federal district (because of its 
racial composition) is more likely to return a death sentence than a state court is not a legitimate 
reason to seek a federal death sentence. See USAM, supra note 15, at §9-10.090 (“When concurrent 
jurisdiction exists with a State or local government, a Federal indictment for an offense subject to 
the death penalty generally should be obtained only when the Federal interest in the prosecution is 
more substantial than the interests of the State or local authorities.”).  
266. United States v. Johnson involves a federal prosecution for the killing of a security guard 
that occurred during a 2004 bank robbery in Orleans Parish, Louisiana. The three black defendants, 
John Johnson, Herbert Jones, and Joseph Smith, intended to commit robbery, but erroneously 
believed that only one guard was working at the bank. Jones and Smith entered first, and Smith 
pointed an inoperable gun at Sidney Zaffuto, the security guard. A second security guard then shot 
at Smith and Johnson as Johnson entered the bank. Struck by a bullet, Johnson fell to the floor and 
started firing his gun while the guards fired their weapons. The one bullet fired by Johnson 
apparently ricocheted off of Zaffuto’s gun and struck Zaffuto in the chest. Smith struggled with 
Zaffuto, exacerbating the wound, and Zaffuto died from the injury. Johnson attempted to plead 
guilty even before he knew it was his bullet that struck Zaffuto. However, Johnson was sentenced to 
death. In May 2010, the district court reversed this sentence. The government is appealing the 
reversal. See United States v. Johnson, No. 04-CR-017 (E.D. La. Jan. 16, 2004). 
267. Memorandum in Support of Mr. Johnson’s Motion to Set Aside the Death Sentence Based 
Upon the Appearance of the Influence of Race and Other Arbitrary Factors at 21, United States v. 
Johnson, 2010 WL 1294058 (E.D. of La. Mar. 29, 2010) (No. 04-CR-17) (on file with author) 
(“Similarly, Mr. Johnson attempted to accept responsibility for his actions by pleading guilty and 
accepting a life sentence without the possibility of parole, and at trial agreeing in large part to the 
allegations presented.”). 
268. See Kaczynski Pleads Guilty, Avoids Death Sentence, CNN.COM, Jan. 22, 1998, 
http://www.cnn.com/US/9801/22/unabomb.wrap/index.html (last visited July 4, 2010). Eric 
Rudolph pleaded guilty and received life imprisonment for two bombing murders, including the 
death of a enforcement officer in a 1998 Southside bombing of a Birmingham abortion clinic in 
which a clinic nurse was also severely injured. See Rudolph Pleads Guilty in Series of Bombings, 
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difficult to prove, and the cost to the democratic function of the 
prosecutor is large. By drawing co-extensive prosecution lines, we 
remove the incentive to obtain a death-sentence by any means possible 
and refasten the decision to prosecute federally to the relative federal 
interest impacted by the offense. Moreover, murders can paralyze 
neighborhoods, but cannot realistically be said to create a stir at the 
federal district level. When citizens closer to center of impact render 
verdicts, that message from the jury box can lead to resource allocation 
at the local government (often the county) level. County-level juries 
better provide the community most impacted by the offense (and its 
punishment) with the power necessary to redress the harm. 
B. Shared Political Affiliation 
We documented above the impact on the racial demographics of the 
jury pool when a capital case is prosecuted federally rather than by the 
state. But race also acts as a proxy for political beliefs: blacks tend both 
to be more politically liberal and to live in the densely populated areas 
where most death-eligible crimes are committed. In turn, Republicans 
are far more likely to favor the death penalty than Democrats.269 The 
result is that capital prosecutions in federal court also change the 
representation of political beliefs in the jury pool. 
For example, Orleans Parish is far more liberal than the rest of the 
Eastern District of Louisiana. In Orleans Parish, 79.3% of voters cast a 
ballot for Barack Obama in the 2008 Presidential election,270 while only 
19.2% voted for John McCain.271 Excluding Orleans Parish, 32.6% of 
voters voted for Obama (65.7% voted for McCain).272 Overall, switching 
to the Eastern District of Louisiana results in a far more conservative 
jury pool (79.3% Obama (Orleans) versus 42.7% Obama in the entire 
                                                     
MSNBC.COM, Apr. 13, 2005 (last visited July 4, 2010). Attorney General Ashcroft described 
Rudolph as “the most notorious American fugitive.” See Henry Schuster, FBI: Olympic Bombing 
Suspect Arrested, CNN.COM, May 31, 2003, http://cnn.com/2003/US/05/31/rudolph.arrest/ (last 
visited July 4, 2010). 
269. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, tbl.2.52.2008 
(2008), available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t2522008.pdf; see also Liptak, supra 
note 236, at A1 (“Jurors eligible to serve in capital cases are ‘demographically unique’ . . . ‘They 
tend to be white’ . . . ‘They tend to be politically conservative—Republican.’”) (quoting Brooke 
Butler, professor at the University of South Florida). 
270. See Appendix 3: Voting Patterns by District, at 17F [hereinafter Appendix 3], available at 
http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/issues/v085/docs/. 
271. Id. at 17G. 
272. See id. at 18F, 18G.  
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district).273 The same trend exists in St. Louis, Missouri, Prince George’s 
County, Maryland and Richmond, Virginia: 
 
• Nearly 84% of St. Louis city voters cast a ballot for Obama 
 (compared to 15.5% for McCain).274 Excluding St. Louis city, 
 voters in the Saint Louis Division of the Eastern District of 
 Missouri cast 52.6% of their votes for Obama and 46% for 
 McCain.275 
 
• Nearly 89% of Prince George’s County voters supported Obama 
 (compared to 10.5% for McCain).276 Without Prince George’s
 County, the District of Maryland voted for Obama by a 57.5% to 
 41.2% margin.277 
 
• Over 79% of Richmond city voters supported Obama (20% for 
 McCain)278 versus 50.6% for Obama and 49.2% for McCain in the 
 Richmond Division of the Eastern District of Virginia (excluding 
 the city of Richmond).279 
 
Drawing juries from the county of offense recognizes the significant 
attitudinal changes regarding crime, punishment, and law enforcement 
that occur as the geographic lens shifts from the county to the federal 
district. The residents of urban areas—where most federal capital crimes 
occur—are more likely (70%) than residents of suburban (63%) or rural 
(59%) areas to believe that the way to fix crime is to fix the underlying 
economic and social problems (as opposed to concentrating more 
resources on police officers, jails, and prosecutions).280 Scarcely 25% of 
residents living in urban areas agree that the best way to lower crime is 
to enhance law and order measures.281 When broken down by race, a 
relevant proxy consideration (as discussed above), 84% of blacks (but 
only 61% of whites) agreed that concentrating on solving underlying 
                                                     
273. Id. at 18F, 16F.  
274. Id. at 31F, 31G. 
275. Id. at 38F, 38G. 
276. Id. at 56F, 56G. 
277. Id. 
278. Id. at 103F, 103G. 
279. Id. at 104F, 104G. 
280. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, tbl.2.0013.2006 
(2006), available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t200132006.pdf.  
281. Id.  
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economic problems is the best way to lower crime.282 Only 14% of 
blacks agreed that the best solution is found in increased law 
enforcement presence.283 
Though blacks and urban dwellers are less likely to favor enhanced 
law enforcement as the primary mechanism to fight crime, blacks are far 
more likely than whites to worry about being the victim of serious 
interpersonal violent crimes, such as being murdered.284 This fear is 
rational: blacks, and especially black males, are far more likely to be 
murdered than whites.285 But despite this (legitimate) fear of crime, 
blacks are less trusting of law enforcement than are whites. For example, 
27% of blacks, but only 6% of whites report “very little confidence” in 
the police.286 Blacks are also more likely than whites to believe that law 
enforcement use of racial profiling is widespread (by roughly 17%).287 
While 67% of blacks believe that police brutality occurs in the area 
where they live, only 25% of whites think the same.288 Blacks are also 
far less likely to favor the death penalty for a person convicted of murder 
(47%) than whites (69%).289 Moreover, when asked if the death penalty 
is applied fairly, 59% of white but only 24% of blacks answered in the 
affirmative.290 
C. Socio-Economic Status 
A person who experiences (or is surrounded by) the devastating 
atmospheric factors that diminish the quality of a person’s decision-
                                                     
282. Id.  
283. Id.  
284. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, tbl.2.39.2008 
(2008), available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t2392008.pdf. 
285. Blacks represent 12.8% of the population, FedStats.gov, USA, http://www.fedstats.gov/ 
quf/states/00000.html (last visited July 4, 2010), but constitute roughly half of all murder victims. 
See FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, Expanded Murder Data tbl.1, 
Murder Victims by Race and Sex (2008), available at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2008/ 
offenses/expanded_information/data/shrtable_01.html.  
286. U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, tbl.2.12.2009 (2009), 
available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t2122009.pdf (also finding that 38% of blacks 
but 63% of whites have “a great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in the police). 
287. U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, tbl.2.26.2004 (2004), 
available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t226.pdf. 
288. U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, tbl.2.0002.2005 
(2005), available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t200022005.pdf. 
289. U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, tbl.2.52.2008 (2008), 
available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t2522008.pdf. 
290. U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, tbl.2.54.2008 (2008), 
available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t2542008.pdf.  
082610 Smith Cohen Final.docx (Do Not Delete) 8/30/2010  8:04 AM 
2010] RACIAL GEOGRAPHY OF THE FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY 483 
 
making capacity is likely in a better position to account for those 
situational factors than a person who lives in a neighborhood where 
crime is predominated by nuisance offenses and urban interlopers.291 
Moreover, juries comprised of a majority of individuals from low socio-
economic communities can send a message about the government’s 
allocation of resources in a different way than juries that are made up 
primarily of well-resourced outsiders. Therefore, if the victim of the 
crime, the offender, and the impacted neighborhood all exist in a realm 
of low resources, then individuals with similar experiences and values 
should determine whether or not the government should be doling out 
death sentences. Shared vernacular, dress, and mannerisms that often 
exist in such communities further underscore the point. 
Though race is a proxy of poverty, it can be disentangled. As one 
commentator explained: 
[A] Black resident of a middle-class neighborhood may be more 
likely to share experiences and interests in common with another 
Black person from the same neighborhood than with a Black 
person from the inner city. Indeed, the Black resident of the 
middle-class neighborhood may well have more interests in 
common with a white neighbor with respect to, for example, 
community policing, public schools, or welfare, than with the 
Black inner-city resident. Thus, although defining political 
groups by race alone may be adequate to capture a substantial 
amount of shared interests, using race in combination with other 
indicia of community, including residential proximity, may 
more effectively capture a more homogenous community.292 
Other commentators note that providing a defendant with a jury of his 
equals and neighbors gives the defendant a firmer belief in the integrity 
of the proceedings: 
A defendant also might feel that a local jury, with whom he or 
she may share cultural values, economic status, racial identity, 
or just a general sense of community identity, would sympathize 
with him more than with the police or the victim. Either way, a 
consistent rule requiring local juries puts the defendant on equal 
footing with the prosecutor, who cannot manipulate the likely 
                                                     
291. Cf. generally Li-yu Song, Mark I. Singer & Trina M. Anglin, Violence Exposure and 
Emotional Trauma as Contributors to Adolescents’ Violent Behaviors, 152 ARCHIVES PEDIATRIC & 
ADOLESCENT MED. 531 (1998).  
292. Forde-Mazrui, supra note 262, at 383; see also Kalt, supra note 81, at 273. (“[P]olice-citizen 
relations are very different in the city than they are in the suburbs, and a scuffle between a Detroiter 
of any race and a suburban policeman would look very different in Detroit than it would in the 
suburbs. Not surprisingly, . . . prosecutors prefer [] to take the case to a suburban jury.”).  
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results of the trial by selecting the jurisdiction with the toughest 
jurors. Both sides know in advance where the jury will be 
from.293 
Even more significantly, local juror participation gives communities in 
the midst of violence a certainty that the criminal justice system aims not 
only to be accurate but fair.294 For all these reasons, the county is the 
best place to draw the vicinage lines in federal death penalty cases. 
VI. FINDING REMEDIES AFTER MCKLESKEY, ARMSTRONG, 
AND BASS 
This Part addresses the difficulty in identifying remedies for 
discrimination retrospectively. First, we look at the way in which case 
law now requires the federal courts to ignore the appearance or 
possibility that race influences sentencing determination. Second, we 
note the difficulty of remedies that require reversal of capital convictions 
and death sentences. Finally, we offer three potential remedies that are 
prospective in nature, and that do not upend the administration of the 
entire federal justice system. 
A. The Challenges of McKleskey, Armstrong, and Bass 
Indeed, defining potential remedies for problems that focus on race 
and the death penalty can feel like a futile exercise after McCleskey v. 
Kemp. 295 In McCleskey, the Court heard the case of a black man, Warren 
McCleskey, whom a Fulton County, Georgia jury convicted and 
sentenced to death for the murder of a white police officer.296 
McCleskey asserted that his death sentence was imposed arbitrarily and 
discriminatorily (in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments) 
                                                     
293. Kalt, supra note 81, at 312.  
294. Ex parte Thompson, 153 S.W.3d 416, 421 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (Cochran, J., concurring) 
(“Our criminal justice system makes two promises to its citizens: a fundamentally fair trial and an 
accurate result. If either of those two promises are not met, the criminal justice system itself falls 
into disrepute and will eventually be disregarded.”); Engel, supra note 65, at 1661 (“[P]erhaps most 
significant, the vicinage presumption fulfills the jury’s democratic function by allowing the 
aggrieved community to participate through its representatives on the jury. . . . This participation is 
essential to what the Supreme Court has described as the ‘community therapeutic value’ of the trial, 
whereby the criminal trial becomes a vehicle for healing the social rupture caused by the crime.”).  
295. 481 U.S. 279 (1987). The Court granted certiorari in McCleskey to determine “whether a 
complex statistical study that indicates a risk that racial considerations enter into capital sentencing 
determinations proves that petitioner McCleskey’s capital sentence is unconstitutional under the 
Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 282–83.  
296. Id. at 283.  
082610 Smith Cohen Final.docx (Do Not Delete) 8/30/2010  8:04 AM 
2010] RACIAL GEOGRAPHY OF THE FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY 485 
 
because, as a black man who killed a white victim, he was statistically 
much more like to receive a death sentence in Georgia.297 The Baldus 
study anchored his claim. 
Professors David C. Baldus, Charles Pulaski, and George Woodworth 
conducted “sophisticated” and “extensive” studies that examined over 
2000 Georgia murder cases.298 Their results were disturbing: only 1% of 
cases with a black murder victim, but 11% of cases with a white murder 
victim, resulted in death sentences.299 When a defendant is black and the 
victim white, 22% of cases result in death.300 But Georgia juries imposed 
death in only 3% of cases with a white defendant and black victim.301 
Georgia prosecutors sought death in 70% of cases with a black 
defendant and a white victim, but in only 19% of cases with a white 
defendant and black victim.302 The result is that Georgia juries imposed 
the death sentence on defendants who killed white victims 4.3 times 
more often than defendants who killed black victims.303 Black 
defendants who killed white victims received death more frequently than 
any other victim/defendant race combination.304 
The Court accepted the Baldus study’s validity, but rejected the claim 
that the demonstration of statistically significant racial disparities in the 
imposition of the death penalty in Georgia could prove that McCleskey 
faced racial discrimination in his particular case.305 The Court 
emphasized that if McCleskey successfully pressed this claim in the 
capital context, other defendants would argue the same in non-capital 
                                                     
297. Id. at 291–92. 
298. Id. at 286–87 (“Baldus subjected his data to an extensive analysis, taking account of 230 
variables that could have explained the disparities on nonracial grounds.”).  
299. Id. at 286.  
300. Id. 
301. Id. Georgia also had an 8% death sentence rate in cases with a white defendant and white 
victim, and a 1% death sentence rate in cases with a black defendant and black victim. Id.  
302. Id. at 287. Georgia prosecutors sought death in 32% of cases with a white defendant and a 
white victim, and in 15% of cases with a black defendant and a black victim. Id. 
303. Id. (noting that this figure was calculated after controlling for 39 non-racial variables).  
304. Id. 
305. Id. at 291 n.7 (“Our assumption that the Baldus study is statistically valid does not include 
the assumption that the study shows that racial considerations actually enter into any sentencing 
decisions in Georgia. Even a sophisticated multiple-regression analysis such as the Baldus study can 
only demonstrate a risk that the factor of race entered into some capital sentencing decisions and a 
necessarily lesser risk that race entered into any particular sentencing decision.”). Id. at 292–93 
(“[T]o prevail under the Equal Protection Clause, McCleskey must prove that the decision-makers 
in his case acted with discriminatory purpose. He offers no evidence specific to his own case that 
would support an inference that racial considerations played a part in his sentence.”). 
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criminal cases.306 Justice Brennan, dissenting, labeled the Court’s 
acknowledgment that “McCleskey’s claim would open the door to 
widespread challenges to all aspects of criminal sentencing,” as “a fear 
of too much justice.”307 In other words, the Court knew that voting with 
McCleskey would deal a crippling blow to the death penalty in America 
and would leave non-capital criminal justice sentences vulnerable. 
Similarly, after McCleskey, in United States v. Armstrong,308 the 
United States Supreme Court effectively shut down litigation on race 
claims by holding that federal prosecutors had broad discretion to act, 
and that without specific proof of race discrimination (in the form of 
“credible evidence that similarly situated defendants of other race could 
have been prosecuted, but were not”), the defendant was not entitled to 
discovery. To justify an order for discovery, the Court held in United 
States v. Bass309 that statistical evidence of racial disparities is not 
enough, and that a defendant needed to show both discriminatory effect 
as well as specific evidence of discriminatory intent. 
Even where a defendant introduced evidence that race may have 
prompted the imposition of capital punishment, district courts after 
McCleskey, Armstrong, and Bass were powerless to reverse a death 
sentence or permit further litigation on the issue. In a recent case 
addressing this issue involving a defendant already sentenced to death, a 
federal district court in New Orleans acknowledged the troubling 
relevance of race in the administration of the federal death penalty: 
The Court is aware of the disturbing statistics regarding the 
disproportionate number of minorities being prosecuted for 
capital offenses and sentenced to death, as pointed out by the 
Amicus Brief of the NAACP. The Court also does not doubt that 
conscious or, more insidiously, unconscious racism can 
influence decisionmaking, from an initial arrest by police 
through a final decision by a jury. In that regard, the Court notes 
with dismay the dismissive attitude of the government with 
regard to this issue, referencing it as a claim that has become 
perfunctory in modern capital cases.310 
                                                     
306. Id. at 315–16. 
307. Id. at 339 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
308. 517 U.S. 456 (1996). 
309. 536 U.S. 862 (2002). 
310. United States v. Johnson, No. 04-CR-00017, 2010 WL 924283, at *5 (E.D. La. Mar. 10, 
2010) (internal quotations omitted).  
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The district court, however, declined to reverse the death sentence or 
require the government to provide a race-neutral explanation for their 
charging decisions, without actual proof of intent to discriminate.311 
B. Prospective Remedies Can Reduce the Impact of Race in the 
Administration of the Federal Death Penalty, Without Dismantling 
the Entire System 
Perhaps one of the dangers of McCleskey is that it proved too much. If 
the United States Supreme Court accepted the theory articulated by 
Warren McCleskey, it would have been obligated to invalidate the death 
penalty imposed on him. This would not only invalidate the death 
sentence imposed on McCleskey and other black defendants on 
Georgia’s death row, but it would have proved that the executions of 
black defendants in Georgia for over a century had been predicated on 
race. In contrast, re-fixing the venire for federal capital offenses to the 
county of offense would provide prospective relief from the possible 
influences of race. The county-level vicinage solution for solving race 
disparities that exist when the federal government prosecutes a capital 
crime (versus when the state prosecutes) does not suffer from the “too 
much justice problem.” The democratic process would dictate the future 
of capital punishment, and the community most affected by the crime 
would be the body responsible for the verdicts. 
Unlike the data available to the McCleskey Court, currently available 
evidence demonstrates that racial disparities in the administration of the 
death penalty exist in the here and now.312 Implicit bias research shows 
that the prejudice from race disparities in capital cases likely affects 
every jury.313 But to counteract that bias, we do not need the judiciary to 
dismantle the death penalty. We have prospectively available options, 
such as reclaiming the county as the place of vicinage in federal capital 
cases, which will result in more diverse and legitimate decision making. 
Moreover, because this vicinage right resolves to defendants in capital 
cases, problems that may arise in the prosecution of federal hate crimes, 
or in instances where a minority group defendants seek the broader 
protection of a district (or a change of venue from the district), 
                                                     
311. Id.  
312. Cf. Jerry Kang & Banaji, supra note 239, at 1065 (surveying results of implicit bias studies 
and concluding, “[n]o longer do we have to choose between a backward-looking frame of corrective 
justice (e.g., compensation for slavery) and a forward-looking frame of utilitarian engineering (e.g., 
potential pedagogical benefit). Instead, we can now view core ‘affirmative action’ programs as 
responses to discrimination in the here and now.”). 
313. See supra Part IV.D.  
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interposing this protection does not risk chaining those defendants with 
the very protections intended to benefit them.314 
The creation of a Batson-style three-step process is another potential 
prospective remedy.315 Under this scheme, a defendant would challenge 
the Government’s decision to proceed with federal capital charges. The 
defendant would have to demonstrate that the charged conduct could 
have been charged as a death-eligible state crime. The defendant must 
also show a substantial change in the demographics of the jury pool as a 
result of the switch from the county of offense to the federal district. 
Upon this showing, the Government could rebut the presumption of 
race-bias by demonstrating race-neutral reasons for proceeding with 
cases in federal rather than state court. At the third step, the judge must 
decide whether improper considerations of the racial composition of the 
jury pool motivated the Government’s decision to pursue capital 
punishment. The judge would take into account all the information from 
steps one and two (and also any information pertaining to the charging 
of other similar crimes by other defendants in state court). This latter 
remedy is far less satisfactory (especially because Batson itself has come 
under much scrutiny in the past few years316) than simply shifting 
vicinage to the county of offense in federal capital cases. 
Finally, in the same manner that the Attorney General masks racial 
identifiers, the Department of Justice can remove all demographic 
identifiers before the Attorney General decides whether to authorize a 
capital charge.317 If the Attorney General received case files with the 
                                                     
314. A defendant’s right to trial in the county of the offense and the risk of prejudicial publicity 
can be reconciled. We should not abandon the vicinage right because there might be pre-trial 
publicity. Instead, to the extent that a defendant believes that publicity in the venire is too pervasive 
to get a fair trial (and the judge agrees), that defendant could waive one right to secure the other.   
315. The Court summarized the three-step Batson test in Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U. S. 322, 
328–329 (2003) (citations omitted):  
First, a defendant must make a prima facie showing that a peremptory challenge has been 
exercised on the basis of race. Second, if that showing has been made, the prosecution must 
offer a race-neutral basis for striking the juror in question. Third, in light of the parties’ 
submissions, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has shown purposeful 
discrimination. 
Id.  
316. See, e.g., Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 273 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (discussing 
scrutiny by other jurists and stating “I believe it necessary to reconsider Batson’s test and the 
peremptory challenge system as a whole”).  
317. The 2001 United States Department of Justice report, “The Federal Death Penalty System: 
Supplementary Data, Analysis and Revised Protocols for Capital Case Review,” explains that “[a]s 
a safeguard against any possible influence of racial or ethnic bias, the [death-authorization] review 
process is carried out in a “race-blind” manner. The United States Attorney’s office does not 
provide information about the race or ethnicity of the defendant to review committee members, to 
attorneys from the Criminal Division’s Capital Case unit who assist the review committee, or to the 
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names and races of the victim and the defendant masked and also 
without knowledge of where the offense took place (not even listing the 
state), we believe this would go far towards eliminating race and 
geographic disparities in the federal death penalty.318 At a more general 
level, masking all demographic information about the offender and the 
victim would further the likelihood that federal capital prosecutions are 
based upon the relative federal interest in the case and not upon other 
arbitrary factors. 
Today, the federal statute setting venue in capital cases, 18 U.S.C. § 
3235, provides that “[t]he trial of offenses punishable with death shall be 
had in the county where the offense was committed, where that can be 
done without great inconvenience.”319 Federal capital crimes are the only 
subsection of federal prosecutions where modern practice does not treat 
venue and vicinage as identical.320 Under 18 U.S.C. § 3235, venue in 
capital cases is set at the county of offense, but jurors are drawn from the 
entire division (or district where no divisions exist). Refastening 
vicinage to the county level in the federal capital context ensures that 
capital defendants who must face the moral judgment of the community 
are not confronted with a mob of outsiders, but by a group of twelve of 
their “equals and neighbors.”321 
                                                     
Attorney General.” U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY SYSTEM: 
SUPPLEMENTARY DATA, ANALYSIS AND REVISED PROTOCOLS FOR CAPITAL CASE REVIEW 7 
(2001). We find no such provision in the Attorney General’s manual for prosecution in capital 
cases. Even assuming that such a process still exists, the process does not mask the racial identity of 
the victim. Moreover, evaluating the names of the victim and the defendant, as well as the victim’s 
family via “victim impact” and the defendant’s family through “mitigating evidence,” will often be 
an accurate proxy for race. Cf. Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Brendan 
More Employable than Lakisha and Jamal?, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 991 (2004) (finding that randomly 
assigning identical resumes either a “very White sounding” or “very African American sounding” 
name resulted in 50% more call-backs for white sounding names). Finally, defendants are allowed 
to present any and all mitigating evidence, including accusations of systemic racial bias. See 
USAM, supra note 15, at § 9-10.120 (“The Capital Review Committee shall review the materials 
submitted by the United States Attorney and any materials submitted by defense counsel. The 
Capital Review Committee will consider all information presented to it, including any allegation of 
individual or systemic racial bias in the Federal administration of the death penalty.”). In sum, the 
Department of Justice’s “race-blind” review is (at best) akin to covering your eyes with your hands 
but peaking through cracked fingers.  
318. Cf. Marilyn Marks, Blind Auditions Key to Hiring Musicians, PRINCETON WKLY. BULL., 
Feb. 12, 2001, at 7, available at http://www.princeton.edu/pr/pwb/01/0212/7b.shtml (detailing how 
“blind” auditions—those that mask gender—result in higher success rates for women who audition 
for orchestras).  
319. 18 U.S.C. § 3235 (2006) (setting venue in capital cases).  
320. Compare id. with Fed. R. Crim. P. 18 (2008) (setting venue within the district of offense in 
federal criminal cases).  
321. One obvious response is that mob-rule historically has been the purview of the county. But 
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CONCLUSION 
Race and place disparities persist in the administration of the federal 
death penalty. Reams of paper have been spent attempting to target their 
source. In this Article, we attempted to look at the irregularities anew. 
We examined the geographic trends more closely, and found that most 
death penalty verdicts come from areas where the switch in vicinage 
from the county to the federal district results in the dilution of minority 
group representation in the jury pool. Capital verdicts become separated 
from the moral judgments of the community when fewer minority group 
members in the jury pool, as well as the general effects of incorporating 
far away decision-makers with little stake in the outcome of the 
proceedings (e.g., Jefferson Parish residents unfazed by murders in the 
New Orleans projects). The resulting juries (whiter and more 
conservative) are more likely to engage in implicit (or explicit) race bias 
against the defendant. 
Refastening the place of vicinage to the county level alleviates the 
appearance of impropriety that surrounds the decision to prosecute a 
capital case federally. If federal capital juries come from the county 
where the offense occurred, then prosecutors are left to determine 
whether to seek the death penalty based on the relative federal interest in 
the crime (and not the prosecutorial interest to secure a death sentence 
by any means possible). This solution is also more democratic—the 
citizens most impacted by the effects of high crime, overly aggressive 
policing, or poor public policy are the decision-makers responsible for 
redressing those harms.322 
Prior studies of the death penalty have assessed whether the racial 
dynamics of defendants sentenced to death (or their victims) mirrors the 
pool of individuals federally charged death sentences, or whether blacks 
and other minorities are disproportionately represented on federal death 
row. The issue left unexamined is whether the federal death penalty is 
imposed disproportionately in the pockets of America where the 
                                                     
hate-crime motivated capital murders are so rare today relative to the number of death-eligible 
murders generally that we do not want to be hostage to the fear of not getting a diverse jury in some 
rural county at the major expense of the routine capital trial where minority vote-dilution occurs to 
the detriment of the defendant and the impacted community. Our suggested shift in vicinage has the 
added benefit of being consistent with the language of 18 U.S.C. § 3235, which states that, “[t]he 
trial of offenses punishable with death shall be had in the county where the offense was committed.” 
As the United States Supreme Court’s Sixth Amendment jurisprudence clarifies, the “trial” begins 
(at least) with the empanelment of jurors. 
322. Of course, in a death penalty prosecution that centers on a crime of truly federal scope—
terrorism, for example—a case can be made for expanding the vicinage to the federal district level 
because the impact is on the national scale (rather than merely local).  
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decision to prosecute federally results in a transformation of the venire 
demographics. The problem with focusing on disproportionate 
representation is that it tries to prove too much (that the entire system is 
infected with racism) and offers no easy remedy (beyond doing away 
with the death penalty altogether). The benefit of focusing on the venire 
is that it employs the same analytical framework as voting rights 
jurisprudence. Moreover, the vicinage approach offers a simple solution: 
select the jury from the county of the offense in federal capital cases, and 
there can be no argument that the decision to prosecute federally was 
used to exploit a shift in the demographics of the venire. 
Critics of our approach might argue that our proposed solutions would 
destroy the federal death penalty. This may be so, but its destruction 
would be a democratic destruction. If juries in the places where most 
death-eligible crimes occur refuse to return death sentences, such a 
result, voiced by the community most impacted by the crime, is more 
democratic than retaining the use of the federal death penalty because 
jurors from far away locales who rarely encounter serious crime are 
willing to hand down death sentences against people who are not 
members of their communities and with whom they will have greater 
difficulty empathizing. As Justice Scalia wrote in his Atkins dissent, 
“[t]here is something to be said for popular abolition of the death 
penalty . . . .”323 
But the real point of this Article is to shine new light on race- and 
place-based arbitrariness in the federal death penalty. As long as a 
narrow band of jurisdictions continue to dole out a disproportionate 
number of federal death sentences, and to do so against a 
disproportionately high number of black citizens (and against defendants 
who murder white victims), the federal government’s experiment with 
the death penalty will continue to be a failure. Considering that the 
disparities that persist today are just as disturbing as those that troubled 
Attorney General Holder in 2000, we hope that the Attorney General 
will examine why they exist and then begin to resolve them. We suggest 
that restoring the county as the place of vicinage—or at the very least 
masking the location of the crime and the relevant federal district during 
the authorization process—is the best way to begin that process. 
We also suggest that any assessment of racial bias within the federal 
death penalty must consider the demographics of the jurisdictions in 
which the federal government has decided to seek the death penalty, and 
the demographics of the jurisdictions in which it has not. Importantly, 
                                                     
323. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 353 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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this inquiry must consider those cases in which the federal government 
chose not to prosecute as much as those cases in which it did. 
Ultimately, it is the intersection of these two inquiries that suggests to us 
a troubling correlation between the demographic make-up and federal 
death sentences.  
